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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Available Decisions:

  • Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay -- 2013 - present
  • Judge William V. Altenberger -- 2016 - present
  • Judge Rachel M. Blise -- 2021 - present
  • Judge William H. Frawley -- 1973 - 1986
  • Judge G. Michael Halfenger -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Beth E. Hanan -- 2023 - present
  • Judge Brett H. Ludwig -- 2017 - 2020
  • Judge Thomas M. Lynch -- 2018 - present
  • Judge Robert D. Martin -- 1990 - 2016
  • Judge Katherine M. Perhach -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Thomas S. Utschig -- 1986 - 2012

Judge Robert D. Martin

Patricia A. Johnson, et al. v. Andrew J. Weihert (In re Weihert), Adv. 12-0105, Case No. 12-10893-7 (02/06/2013) (489 B.R. 558) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 02/06/2013

Case Summary:
Teenage girl died in a rollover accident. The driver had been drinking, underage, at a party hosted by the debtor. Plaintiffs (the victim’s parents and her estate) brought claims of battery and sexual assault at the party, and wrongful death for the rollover accident. The Plaintiffs sought to have these debts determined non-dischargeable as “willful and malicious injury.” The Bankruptcy Court held that the Plaintiffs failed to prove that any battery and sexual assault occurred, given that the Plaintiffs’ main witness was not credible and remaining evidence was negligible. The Bankruptcy Court also held that any social host liability the Debtor may have had for the accident did not rise to the level of willful and malicious injury in this case. Under the standard of Jendusa-Nicolai v. Larsen, 677 F.3d 320, 322 (7th Cir. 2012), the Plaintiffs failed to prove that the Debtor desired to inflict the victim’s injuries or that he knew they were highly likely to result.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - Willful and Malicious Injury

Key Terms:
Dischargeability - Willful and Malicious

In re Coenen, Case No. 12-12141-7 (09/10/2012) (487 B.R. 539) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 09/10/2012

Case Summary:
The Debtor was 100% owner of a limited liability company (LLC), which in turn held legal title to the property on which the Debtor resided. The Debtor attempted to take a Wisconsin homestead exemption in the property, but the Court determined that the Debtor did not have a property interest which could be exempted. The Court held that the Debtor and his LLC were separate legal entities, so the Debtor did not have legal title to the property, and his equitable interest in the property had passed to the Trustee along with his ownership interest in the LLC.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)(3)

Key Terms:
Exemptions – Homestead
Homestead Exemption
Property of the Estate

Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay

Suzannah Meta Schmid v. Bank of America, N.A., and Associated Bank, N.A. (In re Schmid), Adv. No. 12-0160, Case No. 10-12142-13 (01/14/2013) – Judge Catherine J. Furay 01/14/2013

Case Summary:
Debtor sought an indefinite stay of her adversary proceeding. Debtor’s counsel argued that she had discovered new evidence of defects in the transfer of her client’s mortgage and note that amounted to fraud. She asserted that a stay was required to allow her to investigate the evidence, and to reconsider her posture in the adversary proceeding and the underlying bankruptcy case. After reviewing the lengthy procedural history, and evaluating counsel’s description of the evidence, the Court concluded that the motion to stay failed to show adequate cause under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1) to grant a stay.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 -- Time

Key Terms:
Time

Michael Farms, Inc. v. Thomas J. Lundgren (In re Lundgren), Adv. No. 13-0138, Case No. 13-11962-13 (12/17/2013) (503 B.R. 717) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 12/17/2012

Case Summary:
A creditor sought a determination that the Debtor, the sole officer and shareholder of a restaurant, was personally liable for unpaid produce bills pursuant to the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act ("PACA"), and that the amounts owed were nondischargeable in the Debtor’s personal bankruptcy case under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). The Debtor filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that PACA did not impose fiduciary duties for purposes of nondischargeability proceedings. The Court disagreed, finding that PACA establishes a trust on perishable commodities and sales proceeds and imposes duties on the buyers of perishable goods, including fiduciary duties within the meaning of section 523(a)(4). Having also concluded that the Debtor failed to pay the creditor for deliveries of produce, the Court found that the creditor’s complaint stated a claim for relief and denied the Debtor’s motion to dismiss.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud in Fiduciary Capacity

Key Terms:
Fiduciary Capacity

Judge Thomas S. Utschig

Christopher Seelen, Trustee of the Douglas L. Couillard and Deborah M. Couillard Bankruptcy Estate v. Douglas L. Couillard, Deborah M. Couillard, and Bank of America, NA (In re Couillard), Adv. No. 12-0132, Case No. 12-11610-7 (12/06/2012) (486 B.R. 481) 12/06/2012

Case Summary:
The chapter 7 trustee sought to exercise his rights as a subsequent purchaser under state law and avoid a mortgage pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). The lender filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court denied. The trustee then moved for summary judgment and the bank sought reconsideration. The court found that the mortgage did not identify the property with a “definite reference” because the lender did not attach legal descriptions for two parcels. As such, the mortgage was not recorded “as provided by law” and was subject to the interests of a subsequent purchaser. Because the affidavit of correction filed by the lender was invalid under state law, it did not provide constructive notice of anything beyond the defective original mortgage. Consequently, the trustee was entitled to avoid the mortgage. The trustee’s motion for summary judgment was granted, and the bank’s request for reconsideration was denied.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 544 -- Trustee as Lien Creditor
Wis. Stat. § 706.05 -- Formal Requisites for Record
Wis. Stat. § 706.085 -- Correction Instruments
Wis. Stat. § 706.09 -- Notice of Conveyance from the Record

Key Terms:
Lien Avoidance
“Strong Arm” Power 

John M. Cirilli, Trustee v. Leonard D. Bronk (In re Bronk), Adv. No. 10-0044, Case No. 09-15224-7 (11/29/2012) -- Judge Thomas S. Utschig 11/29/2012

Case Summary:
The bankruptcy court entered a judgment allowing the debtor an exemption in an annuity, disallowing an exemption in college savings plans, and granting the debtor’s discharge. On appeal, the district court vacated the judgment, affirmed as to the college savings plans and the discharge, and remanded for further factual findings regarding the annuity. After remand, the bankruptcy court conducted a hearing and reviewed the specific terms of the annuity contract. The court found that distributions under the annuity were conditioned upon the debtor’s age, disability, or death. Because the distributions were in fact based upon these conditions, the annuity fell within the statutory terms and was properly claimed as exempt. The trustee’s objection to the annuity was again overruled and judgment was entered in accordance with the court’s findings.

Statute/Rule References:
Wis. Stat. § 815.18 -- Exemptions

Key Terms:
Annuity
Exemptions (Annuity)

Christopher M. Seelen, Trustee of the Douglas L. Couillard and Deborah M. Couillard Bankruptcy Estate v. Douglas L. Couillard, Deborah M. Couillard, and Bank of America, N.A. (In re Couillard), Adv. No 12-0132, Case No 12-11610-7 (11/09/2012)(486 B.R 466) 11/19/2012

Case Summary:
Trustee sought to avoid a mortgage because it did not have legal descriptions of the property attached to it. The lender had filed an “affidavit of correction” in which it attempted to add two parcels to the mortgage. The trustee contended that the mortgage was void against a subsequent purchaser for value and that the affidavit of correction was likewise invalid because it was not executed by the owners of the property. The court found that the original mortgage was defective insofar as the failure to attach the legal descriptions meant that the mortgage did not appear in the relevant tract index. The affidavit of correction was invalid because it was not properly executed, and could not provide constructive notice of another defective instrument. The lender was also not entitled to an equitable lien or equitable subordination. The lender’s motion for summary judgment was denied.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 544 -- Trustee as Lien Creditor
Wis. Stat. § 706.05 -- Formal Requisites for Record
Wis. Stat. § 706.085 -- Correction Instruments
Wis. Stat. § 706.09 -- Notice of Conveyance from the Record

Key Terms:
Lien Avoidance
“Strong Arm” Power

In re Haake, Case No. 12-11398-11 (09/18/2012) (483 B.R. 524) -- Judge Thomas S. Utschig 09/18/2012

Case Summary:
The debtor was a Minnesota resident who purchased her home through a contract for deed. The contract called for full payment of the balance due by a specific date. After she failed to pay, the vendor served the debtor with a notice of cancellation of the contract in accordance with Minnesota law. She filed bankruptcy in an effort to save her home. The vendor moved for relief from the stay and argued that her right to “cure” the contract had expired under § 108(b) and she had no further right to the property. The court ruled that under relevant Eighth Circuit precedent, a notice of cancellation of a contract for deed created a cure period under § 108(b) that was not stayed by § 362(a); as such, the debtor’s redemption rights had expired. Even if she still held an interest in the property, the debtor could not modify the contract for deed because of the anti-modification provisions of § 1123(b)(5). The motion for relief from stay was granted.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 108(b)
11 U.S.C. § 1123(b) -- Contents of Plan

Key Terms:
Anti-Modification Provisions

Melvyn L. Hoffman, Trustee v. Denise Renee Hartley and Vincent Levi Hartley (In re Hartley), Adv. No. 12-0050, Case No. 11-13956-7 (09/11/2012) (483 B.R. 700) -- Judge Thomas S. Utschig 09/11/2012

Case Summary:
The debtors owned an 82-acre parcel of real estate, 40 acres of which the parties agreed constituted their homestead. The entire property was encumbered by a single mortgage. The chapter 7 trustee sought to apportion the mortgage balance between the homestead and non-homestead parcels in accordance with their relative values. The debtors objected, arguing that the trustee’s request constituted an impermissible infringement of their homestead rights. The bankruptcy court ruled that Wisconsin courts have held that under § 846.11, debtors have the right to “insist” that when a single mortgage covers both homestead and non-homestead property, the non-homestead property must be sold first. The homestead exemption is to be liberally construed and is favored above the rights of creditors. Under the circumstances, the debtors were entitled to allocate the mortgage in such a way as to maximize their homestead exemption. The complaint

Statute/Rule References:
Wis. Stat. § 846.11 -- Homestead, How Sold

Key Terms:
Exemptions (Homestead)

Howard D. White, as Trustee of the Chad L. Pawlak and Jo Ann Pawlak Bankruptcy Estate v. Coyne, Schultz, Becker & Bauer, S.C. (In re Pawlak), Adv. No. 12-0036, Case No. 10-11787-7 (08/29/2012) (483 B.R. 169) -- Judge Thomas S. Utschig 08/29/2012

Case Summary:
Chapter 7 trustee sought to recover $50,000 “flat fee” paid to law firm to represent debtors in potential bankruptcy adversary proceeding. The Trustee alleged that payment of the fee constituted a fraudulent transfer as the Debtors did not receive “reasonably equivalent value” at the time the transfer was made (i.e., prior to the bankruptcy filing). The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the flat fee was not property of the estate at the time of filing. However, all fees paid to attorneys in connection with a bankruptcy case (or a related adversary case) remain subject to review by the Bankruptcy Court. Payment of the fee constituted a pre-petition transfer of the Debtors’ property, even though the funds were paid directly to the law firm as part of a settlement with a third-party insurance company. The promise of future representation constituted a legally binding obligation which had value, even though there was no certainty that an adversary proceeding would be filed. Under the facts of the case, at the time of the transfer the Debtor obtained rights to representation which were roughly worth about the amount they paid. The transfer could not be avoided, and judgment was entered for the Defendant.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 548 -- Fraudulent Conveyance

Key Terms:
Fraudulent Conveyance

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