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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Available Decisions:

  • Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay -- 2013 - present
  • Judge William V. Altenberger -- 2016 - present
  • Judge Rachel M. Blise -- 2021 - present
  • Judge William H. Frawley -- 1973 - 1986
  • Judge G. Michael Halfenger -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Beth E. Hanan -- 2023 - present
  • Judge Brett H. Ludwig -- 2017 - 2020
  • Judge Thomas M. Lynch -- 2018 - present
  • Judge Robert D. Martin -- 1990 - 2016
  • Judge Katherine M. Perhach -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Thomas S. Utschig -- 1986 - 2012

Judge Thomas S. Utschig

Case Summary:
Debtors sought a determination that certain tax obligations were discharged as they had come due more than three years prior to the petition date. The IRS contended that the statutory “lookback” period should be extended due to the debtors’ prior chapter 13 case. The court concluded that the language of the statute which references the period in which “the stay of proceedings was in effect in a prior case” only authorizes an extension of the lookback period if the automatic stay in a prior case actually precluded the IRS from pursuing collection actions. The debtors’ plan had been confirmed before the taxes came due, and as a result the IRS was not “disabled” from collecting the taxes by the prior case. The taxes were discharged.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) -- Nondischargeability - Taxes

Key Terms:
Taxes - Nondischargeability


Case Summary:
The debtors attempted to avoid a lien on a car on the grounds that the lien had not been properly assigned.  The court found that the lien had been assigned under the terms of Wis. Stat. § 342.21, which provides that a secured party may assign a security interest in a vehicle and that upon assignment, the assignee does not need to reissue the certificate of title with the assignee named as the secured party.  Under Wisconsin law, the assignment affected neither the owner’s interest nor the validity of the original security interest.  The debtors could not avoid the lien.

Statute/Rule References:
Wis. Stat. § 342.21-- Assignment of Security Interest

Key Terms:
Assignment of Security Interest
Security Interest - Assignment


Case Summary:
The debtor owed approximately $147,000.00 in student loans. He was 52 years old, single, with no dependents. He had obtained an undergraduate degree and a master’s degree in computer science from Northwestern University. He finished his education in 1999. He worked in his field until 2003, when he lost his job and then worked as a contract computer technician. His last job in the computer science field was in 2007, and he worked as a carpenter for a time until his health prevented him from doing so. He had a heart condition which first manifested in 2004; this condition mandated several surgeries and required medication, regular medical appointments, and physical restrictions which would continue indefinitely. He also suffered from a physical condition which made it difficult to engage in computer keyboarding (and for which he had four unsuccessful surgeries). He began receiving social security disability payments in May of 2008. He had sought employment in the computer field and been unsuccessful. The Court concluded that his financial situation was likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period, thus satisfying the “certainty of hopelessness” mandated by the Seventh Circuit in In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993), and Goulet v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 284 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2002).

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) -- Nondischargeability - Student Loans

Key Terms:
Student Loans


Case Summary:
Debtors moved to dismiss a portion of the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. While the federal rules require only a “short and plain statement” of the plaintiffs’ claim, there must be enough alleged to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” The plaintiffs sought to deny the debtors’ discharge under § 727(a)(4)(C), which relates to a debtor who knowingly, in connection with a case, gave or received something as an inducement to act (or to forebear from acting). This section essentially relates to bribery or extortion in connection with a bankruptcy case; the complaint featured no factual allegations to support such a claim. The Court also agreed with the debtors that a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A) was not plausible on its face. Both counts were dismissed.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(C) -- Bribery of Officials in Connection with Case


Judge Robert D. Martin

Case Summary:
The Trustee brought an adversary proceeding against Plains Marketing Canada under § 547(b) to recover payments the debtor made to Plains for the delivery of gasoline. Plains argued that the payments fell within the safe harbor provision of § 546(e) because they constituted settlement payments pursuant to three forward contracts. The Bankruptcy Court found that two contracts qualified as “forward contracts” under § 101(25) because they matured more than two days after the contracts were entered into. The third contract did not meet this definition. Because payments related to the forward contracts were protected by § 546(e), the Court granted Plains’s motion for summary judgment as to two of the contracts. Plains had also raised defenses under § 547(c)(2) and § 547(c)(4), but Plains failed to establish that the payments were made in the ordinary course of business or that new value had been given.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 101(25)
11 U.S.C. § 101(51A)
11 U.S.C. § 546(e) -- Preferences
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) -- Preferences

Key Terms:
Forward Contract
Forward Contract Merchant
Maturity Date
Settlement


Case Summary:
LeRoy Lee filed two adversary actions against Harvey Haukaas, and a separate case against Harlan Haukaas to determine the nondischargeability of his claim under § 523(a)(4) and § 523(a)(6). The two cases were consolidated for trial. Just before trial, the parties agreed to submit stipulated facts, and a trial was never held. Lee argued that he was injured when the Defendants transferred corporate assets to a new corporate entity, which precluded his ability to collect on an unsecured debt that he was owed by the original corporation. Based on stipulated facts, the Court concluded Lee was not injured by the defendants’ conduct, because the original corporate entity that was controlled by the defendants had no assets that were unencumbered, and thus available for unsecured creditors. Accordingly, Lee failed to meet his burden under § 523(a)(6). The Court also found that Lee had neither established that an express trust existed, nor that the Defendants ever owed, or breached any fiduciary duties owed to Lee, as a creditor. As a result, Lee did not establish a claim under § 523(a)(4). The Court dismissed Lee’s complaint.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud in Fiduciary Capacity
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - Willful and Malicious Injury
Wis. Stat. § 134.01

Key Terms:
Civil Conspiracy
Defalcation While Acting as a Fiduciary
Fiduciary Duties Owe Corporate Directors Owe to Creditors
Willful and Malicious - Defined


Case Summary:
Chase Bank commenced this action for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(14) against the Defendant. The Defendant had charged a tax deposit to the IRS on his Chase Bank credit card. The deposit was not for the payment of tax, but rather served as a deposit if the IRS later determined that the Defendant owed income tax for tax year 2009. Subsequently, the Defendant received a refund from the IRS for an amount in excess of the initial deposit. Because Chase presented no evidence that the Defendant actually had a tax liability for 2009, Chase could not establish that the deposit was used to pay a “tax owed” to the IRS under § 523(a)(14). Accordingly, the Court dismissed Chase’s complaint and rendered the debt discharged.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) -- Nondischargeability - Taxes
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(i) 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(14) -- Nondischargeability - Marital Obligations
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) -- Nondischargeability - Marital Obligations

Key Terms:
Deposit Paid for Income Tax
Income Tax
Non-Dischargeable Tax
Taxes - Dischargeability


Case Summary:
Midwest Property commenced this adversary action against the Defendant to determine the nondischargeability of its claim under § 523(a)(4). The Defendant served as a general contractor in a project for the construction of a log home. After receiving $119,000 from the owner, the Defendant paid all subcontractors on the job, except one. While one subcontractor was left unpaid, the Defendant retained $18,000 to cover the cost of his own labor and other costs on the project. The Court held that the Defendant’s retention of the funds did not constitute “defalcation of a fiduciary.” General contractors have a right to retain funds to cover their own costs, providing the retention of funds is proportional to any amounts paid to subcontractors. Accordingly, the Defendant’s conduct could not be characterized as reckless and Midwest’s complaint for nondischargeability was discharged.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud in Fiduciary Capacity
Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5) -- Theft by Contractor

Key Terms:
Defalcation while Acting as a Fiduciary
Express Trust
Statutory Trust
Theft by Contractor


Case Summary:
Attorney for municipality failed to timely file a claim for personal property taxes due in Debtors’ Chapter 7 case. Attorney moved to extend the time period to file claim, which Bankruptcy Court denied. Because a portion of municipality’s claim was deemed “priority” and because few assets were expected to be distributed in Debtors’ case, attorney’s error had negligible effect on any dividend to municipality. The Court saw no reason for extension of the claim’s deadline.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 501(c) -- Filing Proofs of Claim
11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9)
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)

Key Terms:
Allowable Claim
Attorney Error
Chapter 7 Distribution
Extension of Time
Priority


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