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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Available Decisions:

  • Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay -- 2013 - present
  • Judge William V. Altenberger -- 2016 - present
  • Judge Rachel M. Blise -- 2021 - present
  • Judge William H. Frawley -- 1973 - 1986
  • Judge G. Michael Halfenger -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Beth E. Hanan -- 2023 - present
  • Judge Brett H. Ludwig -- 2017 - 2020
  • Judge Thomas M. Lynch -- 2018 - present
  • Judge Robert D. Martin -- 1990 - 2016
  • Judge Katherine M. Perhach -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Thomas S. Utschig -- 1986 - 2012

Judge Thomas S. Utschig

Case Summary:
The debtors received their 2009 tax refunds after they filed bankruptcy. They filed amended schedules in which they sought to exempt the tax refunds as “depository accounts” under Wis. Stat. § 815.18(3)(k). The bankruptcy trustee objected to the exemption, contending that the refunds did not constitute a “depository account” as defined by § 815.18(2)(e). While recognizing that the exemption laws are to be liberally construed in favor of the debtors, the Court also noted that under Wisconsin law courts are obligated to enforce the statute as written and not create exemptions which the legislature has not authorized. While some people may use their tax withholding as a form of forced savings, a tax refund is not sufficiently akin to the sorts of accounts listed in Wis. Stat. § 815.18(2)(e), nor is the government sufficiently similar to the types of financial institutions contemplated by the statute. At the time of filing, the debtors held a right to receive a tax refund which was property of the estate and did not qualify for exemption under Wis. Stat. § 815.18(3)(k). The trustee’s objection was sustained.

Statute/Rule References:
Wis. Stat. § 815.18 -- Exemptions

Key Terms:
Exemptions (Tax Refunds)


Case Summary:
Attorney who had represented the debtor in a pre-petition state court action filed an adversary proceeding, contending that his law firm’s claim for attorney’s fees was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). The attorney argued that he had relied upon the debtor’s fraudulent representation, made approximately two years prior to the petition date, that he would not file for bankruptcy protection. The creditor also argued that the debtor had improperly prepared his means test form, and that the case should be dismissed under § 707(b)(2). The Court first considered the request that the case be dismissed for “presumed abuse” under § 707(b)(2) and concluded that the motion was untimely. Even had it been filed in a timely fashion, there was no substantive basis for dismissal of the case. The plaintiff argued that the debtor should have included his girlfriend’s income in the calculation of his current monthly income for purposes of the means test, but even if the debtor had done so, he would have been entitled to increase his household size, which would still mean that the debtor was below-median income and the case could not be presumed abusive. As for the fraud claims, the Court concluded that even if the debtor did promise not to file bankruptcy, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the debtor acted with fraudulent intent or that the plaintiff justifiably relied upon the promise. Consequently, the Court granted judgment in favor of the debtor and awarded attorney’s fees to the debtor as the complaint was not “substantially justified.”

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud
11 U.S.C. § 707 -- Dismissal
11 U.S.C. § 727(d) -- Discharge - Revocation

Key Terms:
Discharge - Revocation
Dismissal (Presumption of Abuse)
Fraud


Case Summary:
The chapter 13 trustee objected to confirmation of the plan proposed by above-median income debtors. The debtors had proposed a plan of only 54 months in length. The trustee contended that the under § 325(b)(1)(B), the plan could only be confirmed if it met the terms of the “applicable commitment period,” which in the debtors’ case was 60 months. The debtors argued that the “projected disposable income” calculation and the applicable commitment period were not temporal requirements, but simply multipliers. Since their plan proposed to pay unsecured creditors the amount of money required by the projected disposable income calculation, they believed the temporal length of the plan did not matter. The Court ruled that while there is a logical basis for associating shorter plans with a greater likelihood of success, the statutory language dictated the result. The language of the statute is temporal in nature, and Congress clearly intended that above-median income debtors would be required to propose a 60-month plan term in the event of an objection by the trustee or unsecured creditors. The trustee’s objection was sustained.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 1325 -- Confirmation of Chapter 13 Plan

Key Terms:
Applicable Commitment Period
Confirmation of Chapter 13 Plan


Judge Robert D. Martin

Case Summary:
The Debtor’s attorney applied for administrative expenses incurred as he pursued a state court cause of action that resulted in a small settlement for the estate.   The Chapter 7 Trustee objected and claimed he was entitled to the funds.  The Bankruptcy Court held that the attorney was entitled to only a partial recovery, since 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3) allows administrative expenses only of those who have made a “substantial contribution” to the estate.  The Court reasoned that the contribution could be substantial only if it yielded funds for unsecured creditors.  Accordingly, the Court ordered that half the proceeds be distributed to unsecured creditors, with the remaining half divided between the Debtor’s attorney and the Trustee.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4)

Key Terms:
Administrative Expenses
Trustee Fees


Case Summary:
In an adversary proceeding to avoid certain transfers as preferential, the Court found that all the elements of a preference had been proven.  However, the Creditor had a compete defense.  First, many of the transfers were made in the ordinary course as between the two parties.  Although the parties’ payment history was sui generis, they established a pattern where the Debtor would pay the Creditor in irregular amounts, by check or wire transfers, whenever it had funds available.  Those payments that fell outside the ordinary course were shielded by the new value defense, in that after the Debtor made the payments, the Creditor delivered at least as much grain on an unsecured basis.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) -- Preferences
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) -- Preferences
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) -- Preferences
11 U.S.C. § 547(g) -- Preferences

Key Terms:
New Value
Ordinary Course
Preferences


Case Summary:
The Debtors appealed a decision of the Bankruptcy Court to the District Court, and the opposing party moved to strike certain items from the appellate record.  The motion also objected to the Debtors’ designation of issues on appeal.  The Court held that it had jurisdiction to decide issues relating to the record on appeal, and denied the two motions.  Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8006 does not permit an appellee to strike items from the record on appeal, although the Court agreed to transmit the disputed items to the District Court separately.  Further, Rule 8006 only permits an appellee to file a statement of issues on appeal if he has filed a cross-appeal.  Since no cross-appeal had been filed, the objection was denied.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8006

Key Terms:
Motion to Strike
Record on Appeal
Statement of Issues on Appeal


Case Summary:
Pro se Chapter 7 debtors failed to appear at a pretrial conference or file the required pretrial statement in an adversary proceeding.  The Court entered a default.  The Plaintiffs in the proceeding brought a motion for default judgment, but failed to properly serve the Debtors.  The Debtors failed to appear, and the judgment of default was granted.  The Debtors then retained counsel and sought to reopen their case to set aside the default judgment and entry of default.  The Court held that the default judgment was void, given the lack of notice to the Debtors.  But the Court refused to remove the entry of default, since the Debtors failed to show good cause.  Pro se litigants were not, the Court held, automatically entitled to more lenient treatment than other litigants.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7055
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024

Key Terms:
Default
Default Judgment
Entry of Default


Case Summary:
The Chapter 13 Debtor omitted a creditor from her schedules.   The Creditor got no official notice of the filing before the claims bar date, but did have actual notice of the filing from the Debtor.  Notwithstanding this actual notice, the Creditor filed a claim after the bar date.  The Chapter 13 Trustee refused to pay the claim.  The Court held that generally, late-filed claims are not allowed in a Chapter 13 case.  While there may be narrow circumstances where due process or equitable concerns require allowance, those circumstances were not present here because the Creditor had actual notice.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 502(a)(9)
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2)(c)
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c) -- Time for Filing Proof of Claim
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 -- Time

Key Terms:
Actual Notice
Due Process
Late Filed Claim


Case Summary:
Two utility providers moved for allowance of administrative priority claims under § 503(b)(9) for the value of electricity supplied in the ninety days pre-petition.  The Debtor objected, claiming that electricity was not a “good.”  The Court disagreed, and allowed the priority claim.  The Court applied the Uniform Commercial code’s definition of “goods” as all things moveable at the time of identification to the contract.  The Court found that the electricity was identified at the time it was metered at the Debtor’s plant, and that it was moveable both before and immediately after being metered.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9)
11 U.S.C. § 546(c) -- Right of Reclamation

Key Terms:
Administrative Priority
Electricity
Goods


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