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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Available Decisions:

  • Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay -- 2013 - present
  • Judge William V. Altenberger -- 2016 - present
  • Judge Rachel M. Blise -- 2021 - present
  • Judge William H. Frawley -- 1973 - 1986
  • Judge G. Michael Halfenger -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Beth E. Hanan -- 2023 - present
  • Judge Brett H. Ludwig -- 2017 - 2020
  • Judge Thomas M. Lynch -- 2018 - present
  • Judge Robert D. Martin -- 1990 - 2016
  • Judge Katherine M. Perhach -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Thomas S. Utschig -- 1986 - 2012

Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay

Thomas Kriescher, Vicky Kriescher, and Marjac, Inc. v Marjorie Ellen Gibson (In re Gibson), Adv. No. 14-0034, Case No. 13-15635-7 (11/03/2015) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 11/03/2015

Case Summary:
Marjorie Gibson brought this matter before the Court to vacate a prior order granting partial summary judgment and to alter or amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Gibson claimed that there may have been additional evidence that could have been presented at trial. The Court first determined that the motion to vacate was timely filed. The time limit to file such a motion in Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b) did not begin to run until judgment was entered on all claims, not when the partial summary judgment was entered. Next, the Court determined there was no reason to vacate the award of partial summary judgment or alter the findings. There was never any dispute about the facts. Gibson presented only hypotheticals without any real evidence that could have arisen at trial. If there were other facts or evidence supporting opposition to the award of partial summary judgment, they should have been presented at that time. No such facts or evidence were presented, and therefore the motion to vacate was denied.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052(b) -- Amended or Additional Findings
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b) -- Amended or Additional Findings

In re Simpson, Case No. 14-13126-7 (09/23/2015) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 09/23/2015

Case Summary:
The Court overruled the Trustee’s objection to the Debtor’s claim of exemptions. The Debtor claimed an exemption in a personal injury claim 10 months after filing the bankruptcy petition, even though the claim arose pre-petition and the Trustee gave the Debtor repeated reminders to claim the exemption on his schedules. The Trustee argued that the exemption was not timely filed under Wis. Stat. § 815.18(6)(a). Section 815.18(6)(a) states an exemption may be claimed within a reasonable time after seizure, but shall be claimed prior to disposition of the property. Harmonizing Wis. Stat. § 815.18(6)(a) with Rule 1009, the closure of the case is a reasonable time after seizure. Therefore, § 815.18(6)(a) is to be read broadly, in conjunction with Rule 1009, to allow a debtor to amend his exemptions to add additional claims up until the time the case is closed.

Statute/Rule References:
Wis. Stat. § 815.18 -- Exemptions

Key Terms:
Exemptions

In re Achtor, Case No. 14-13286-13 (08/03/2015) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 08/03/2015

Case Summary:
The Debtors objected to two proofs of claim filed by a credit card company. They asserted their corporation incurred the debt, they were guarantors, and the claims should be disallowed because they were “not non-contingent AND liquidated.” The Court found that under the terms of the credit card agreements, the Debtors were personally jointly and severally liable for the credit card debt. There was no evidence to the contrary. The agreement was enforceable, so the objection was overruled and the claims were allowed.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 502 -- Allowance of Claims or Interests
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f)

Key Terms:
Claims - Allowances

In re Rapraeger, Case No. 13-10869-7 (07/16/2015) (534 B.R. 778) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 07/16/2015

Case Summary:
The holder of a fourth-priority mortgage on property filed a motion to vacate an order approving sale of the property after it did not get paid in full from the proceeds. The Court had granted a motion to shorten time for notice and a motion to sell in turn after no objection was filed to either. The fourth-priority mortgagee asserted it had relied on a statement in an affidavit from the Debtors’ counsel in support of the motion to shorten time indicating the sale would pay secured creditors in full. The Court denied the motion to vacate, finding that it was not made within a reasonable time under Rule 60(c) and further finding that even if it had been, the creditor had not stated grounds justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (3), or (4)-(6).

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 -- Relief from Judgment or Order
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) -- Relief from a Judgment or Order

Key Terms:
Relief from Judgment or Order

In re Spencer, Case No. 15-11204-13 (05/15/2015) (531 B.R. 208) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 05/15/2015

Case Summary:
The Court found a bank demonstrated it had standing to seek relief from stay. Its foreclosure judgment demonstrated it had a “colorable claim” to property. The Debtor did not meet her burden of showing making a payment in the amount of the regular monthly mortgage payment to the Debtor’s attorney’s trust fund adequately protected the bank’s interest. Thus, the bank was entitled to relief from stay for cause under section 362(d)(1). It was also entitled to relief under section 362(d)(2). The Debtor stipulated she had no equity in the property, and she failed to meet her burden of proving it was necessary for an effective reorganization. Her proposed sale of the property would not result in proceeds available for any other creditor, nor would it generate exempt proceeds for purchase of a new home. Her personal liability for the debt had previously been discharged.

The Court also granted in rem relief from stay as to the property, finding the filing of the petition was part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors involving multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the property.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 362 -- Automatic Stay
11 U.S.C. § 362(g) -- Automatic Stay - Burden of Proof

Key Terms:
Automatic Stay
In Rem Relief
Rooker-Feldman

Sheila Marie Spencer v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, a/k/a Freddie Mac, et al. (In re Spencer), Adv. No. 15-0060, Case No. 15-11204-13 (05/15/2015) (532 B.R. 303) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 05/15/2015

Case Summary:
At the time this adversary proceeding was filed, a motion for relief from stay was pending in the main case. The Debtor’s arguments in opposition appeared to require the conclusion that until a determination was reached in the adversary proceeding, it was impossible to determine whether the movant had standing to seek relief from stay. Thus, the Court reviewed the adversary complaint. Because the review suggested the Debtor was challenging the validity of a foreclosure judgment, the Court ordered the Debtor to explain why the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not bar the claims. After considering her response and other submissions, the Court determined it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the complaint.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 362 -- Automatic stay
11 U.S.C. § 362(g) -- Automatic stay - Burden of Proof

Key Terms:
Automatic Stay
In Rem Relief
Rooker-Feldman

Judge Robert D. Martin

In re Community Health Systems, Inc., Case No. 14-11319-11 (08/25/2015) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 08/25/2015

Case Summary:
Creditor, Dr. Phuoc Vuong, one of the Debtor’s former employees, filed a claim in the amount of $7,624.00 for reimbursement for vacation time and continuing education expenses. Dr. Vuong was terminated for cause on April 15, 2014. However, he argued that he was entitled to reimbursement for continuing education expenses relating to classes which he was scheduled to attend from April 21st through 25th in 2014. The Debtor objected to Dr. Vuong’s claim, arguing that, although Dr. Vuong was owed the regular vacation time, he was not owed reimbursement for the continuing education expenses because he had neither obtained approval to attend nor actually attended any classes. The Court found in favor of the Debtor as to the continuing education expenses, holding that that the Debtor had carried its burden in defeating the presumption in favor of the validity of Dr. Vuong’s claim. Specifically, the Court held that the employment contract introduced into evidence by the Debtor provided that an employee would only be reimbursed for continuing education expenses where the employee had both received approval from a supervisor to attend continuing education classes and successfully completed the classes with proof of credit earned. In this case the court found that Dr. Vuong had done neither of these things, and, thus, his claim was limited to reimbursement for vacation time.

In re Koenig, Case No. 14-14446-7 (07/13/2015) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 07/13/2015

Case Summary:
Debtors claimed exemptions in three annuity accounts pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 815.18(3)(j). The Trustee objected, relying on Wis. Stat. § 815.18(3)(f). The only issue before the Court was the interpretation of § 815.18(3)(j), in particular the phrase “the plan or contract complies with the provisions of the internal revenue code.” The prevailing view is that compliance with the IRC is accomplished by meeting the tax-deferral provision of IRC § 72. However, the Trustee argued that compliance with the IRC is accomplished by meeting the retirement plan provisions of IRC §§ 401-409 because a broader interpretation makes the amendment to Wis. Stat. § 815.18(3)(f) redundant. The Court found that the amendment of § 815.18(3)(f) did not change the prevailing statutory interpretation of § 815.18(3)(j). Thus, debtors only need to comply with IRC § 72 to exempt a retirement annuity under Wis. Stat. § 815.18(3)(j).

In re Home Casual LLC, Case No.13-11475-7 (05/19/2015) (534 B.R. 350) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 05/19/2015

Case Summary:

Creditors filed a motion to grant standing to pursue, on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, preference and fraudulent transfer claims against debtor’s insiders. Although the Creditor had ongoing discussions with the Trustee about various causes of action, the Trustee declined to pursue the actions at issue. Generally, a creditor may bring an avoidance action under the theory of derivative standing. The Court found that while the Trustee’s decision not to pursue the actions was well thought out and reflected no improper motives, it was not technically justified in the manner which would preclude granting derivative standing to the Creditor. Furthermore, the Creditor volunteered to absorb the costs in the event the actions were unsuccessful. Thus, derivative standing was appropriate in this case because of the low cost and risk placed on the estate.
In re Heffron-Clark, Case No. 10-18035-7 (04/23/2015) (530 B.R. 439) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 04/23/2015

Case Summary:
The Chapter 7 Trustee objected to an executing judgment creditor’s state-created lien. Previously, the Trustee had initiated an adversary proceeding to avoid the lien but dismissed it on stipulation. While the case was on appeal to the Supreme Court concerning an exemption issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued a ruling overturning the law which validated the executing judgment creditor’s lien. As a result, the Trustee filed an objection to the Creditor’s claim. The Creditor argued dismissal of the avoidance action precluded the Trustee from objecting to the claim and that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ruling in Associated Bank v. Collier, 355 Wis. 2d 343 (2014), should not apply retroactively. The Court found that the theories of res judicata, law of the case, estoppel by record, and laches did not preclude the Trustee from objecting to the claim. Furthermore, the Court found that the only way to practically interpret Collier was to use retroactive application. Therefore, the Court sustained the Trustee’s objection. 

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