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Opinions
The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.
Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.
For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.
Available Decisions:
- Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay -- 2013 - present
- Judge William V. Altenberger -- 2016 - present
- Judge Rachel M. Blise -- 2021 - present
- Judge William H. Frawley -- 1973 - 1986
- Judge G. Michael Halfenger -- 2020 - present
- Judge Beth E. Hanan -- 2023 - present
- Judge Brett H. Ludwig -- 2017 - 2020
- Judge Thomas M. Lynch -- 2018 - present
- Judge Robert D. Martin -- 1990 - 2016
- Judge Katherine M. Perhach -- 2020 - present
- Judge Thomas S. Utschig -- 1986 - 2012
Judge Robert D. Martin
Case Summary:
Green County filed a complaint against the Debtor seeking a determination of nondischargeability of a debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(18) or 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5). The debt arose when a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the best interests of the debtors child in a juvenile action in Green County Circuit Court. Green County did not meet its burden to prove nondishcargeability under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5). Green County provided no details regarding the underlying juvenile action, however, guardian ad litem bills seemed to indicate that the fees arose from a Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) proceeding. Although the debt was incurred for the welfare of the child, the obligation to the County is not a nondischargeable debt for the purpose of 523(a)(5) if it arose under Wis. Stat. § 48.235. Wis. Stat. § 48.235 allows the County to seek reimbursement from parents of amounts paid by the County to a guardian ad litem. If the debt arose under 48.235, it is a debt to the County and does not meet the requirement under 523(a)(5) that the nondischargeable debt be owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child. Where the Debtors child is not seeking support, but a governmental entity is trying to enforce its rights against a parent under a state statute for reimbursement, 523(a)(5) is not implicated. Green County did not prove nondischargeability under 523(a)(18) either because it did not allege or argue that the debt is enforceable under Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act. Exceptions to discharge are construed strictly against a creditor and liberally in the debtor's favor, Green County failed to meet its burden of proof.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) -- Nondischargeability - Divorce Decrees
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(18)
42 U.S.C. § 651-669
Wis. Stat. § 48.235 -- Guardian ad Litem
Key Terms:
Non-Dischargeable Debt
Case Summary:
Two and a half years prior to filing his Chapter 7 petition, the Debtor obtained a loan to purchase a manufactured home. The Debtor applied for a new title certificate from the Wisconsin Department of Commerce (DOC). His application was returned because he did not submit an existing certificate of title to accompany the application. The Debtor took no further action to title the home. When the Bank filed a motion for abandonment in the Debtor’s bankruptcy the Trustee objected, stating that the Bank’s lien was not perfected because there was no title showing the Bank’s interest. The Bank argued that its security interest in the Debtor’s home was perfected when the DOC received the application and accompanying fees, and that sending an existing certificate of title was unnecessary because one did not exist. The Bank’s alternative argument was that the Debtor did not own his home because there was no certificate of title indicating his ownership, and if the Debtor has no interest in the home the trustee has no standing to challenge the bank’s lien. The Court held that the Bank’s security interest was not perfected because the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 101.9213(2) were not met. Not having a certificate of title on hand is not the same as there being no certificate of title in existence. The Bank did not comply with statutory requirements to timely perfect its lien. The Bank’s argument that the Debtor did not own his home and that the Trustee lacked standing to object to the Bank’s motion also fails. Even if the Debtor did not have all the legal indices of ownership of the property due to his failure to comply with Wis. Stat. § 101.9209, he still has an equitable interest in the property based on his payment of the purchase price to the seller. The bankruptcy estate includes equitable interests of a debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. The Bank’s motion for abandonment was denied.
Statute/Rule References:
Wis. Stat. § 101.9203 -- When Certificate of Title Required
Wis. Stat. § 101.9213 -- Perfection of Security Interests
Wis. Stat. § 101.9214 -- Duties on Creation of Security Interest
Key Terms:
Security Interests - Perfection
Case Summary:
Chapter 11 debtor converted to Chapter 7. After conversion, the Debtor did not assume or reject its long-term lease with Madison East Shopping Center Partners (MESC), nor were any payments made for the amount due under the lease as required by 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3). Sixty days after conversion, the lease automatically terminated pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4). MESC sought immediate payment of post conversion rent under 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3). The Trustee objected to immediate payment, arguing that the disputed amount was entitled only to administrative expense priority because there is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code granting “super-priority” status to claims under Section 365(d)(3). The Trustee also stated that the bankruptcy estate did not have funds sufficient to make the payment. The Court determined that the language in Section 365(d)(3) requiring “timely performance” places payment of rent before the payment of administrative expenses. That is true even where the bankruptcy estate is administratively insolvent. Pre-rejection lease payments are required to be timely made. Where the Trustee does not perform that obligation, he cannot be excused from the consequence of his nonperformance. The claims must be paid when due, or in any event prior to allowed administrative expenses.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1)
11 U.S.C. § 365(d)
11 U.S.C. § 507
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)
Key Terms:
Claims - Priority
Case Summary:
Four creditors in a Chapter 13 case filed claims secured by the Debtor’s home. A hearing was held to determine the value of the home. After subtracting the first three secured claims from the determined value, there was $4,024.22 in equity remaining. Therefore, the fourth claim (Sherman) was entitled to a secured claim of $4,024.22 and a general unsecured claim for the remainder of its claim. Sherman filed a motion to reconsider based on its assertion that the equitable doctrine of marshaling of assets should be applied. Since a priming creditor’s claim was also secured by the Debtor’s automobile, Sherman argued that the creditor should be required to satisfy its debt to the extent possible through the automobile, so to leave more equity in the home to secure Sherman’s debt. A request for marshaling of assets must be brought as an adversary proceeding pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7001. Sherman brought its request for marshaling as a defense to the Debtor’s objection to claim. Sherman’s attempt to argue for marshaling in this manner does not allow a full inquiry into facts relevant to the elements listed above. Nor was the evidence presented at the hearing sufficient to make the necessary findings, if the procedural requirements were ignored.
Key Terms:
Claims
Marshaling
Judge Thomas S. Utschig
Case Summary:
Creditor sought determination that its claims against the debtors were nondischargeable. The creditor alleged that the debtors had misrepresented the existence of certain accounts receivable which served as the borrowing base of a line of credit. The court found that, under the facts of the case, the debtors’ loan obligation was not a factoring arrangement but a capital loan. The debtors did not “obtain” an extension of credit from the plaintiff through the use of the allegedly fraudulent borrowing base certificates. At most, the certificates induced the creditor to forbear collection activities, but it did not surrender or lose any legal rights as a result of its reliance on the documents. The debtors also did not engage in fraud in a fiduciary capacity or harm any property interest of the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s claim was discharged.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud in Fiduciary Capacity
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - Willful and Malicious Injury
Case Summary:
Debtor previously filed bankruptcy in 1998, and refiled in January 2006, shortly after the effective date of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. The U.S. Trustee objected to the debtor’s discharge, contending that the debtor was not eligible to receive one under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8), which as amended extended the period between chapter 7 discharges to eight years. The Court found that the debtor did not have a substantive right to receive a discharge within six years of her prior filing. As the bankruptcy amendments only affected her ability to prospectively file bankruptcy, she was subject to the statutory terms in effect when she filed the new case. Consequently, the debtor’s discharge was denied.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C.§ 727 -- Discharge
Case Summary:
The debtor filed an adversary proceeding against State Farm for a violation of the discharge injunction. At the time of the debtor’s bankruptcy, State Farm’s subrogation unit had two lawsuits pending against the debtor; both lawsuits stemmed from the same automobile accident. State Farm was represented by different law firms in each action. One law firm was clearly notified of the bankruptcy, and forwarded that notice to State Farm’s collection/subrogation unit. An agent in the subrogation unit thereafter directed the dismissal of that lawsuit; the other lawsuit, however, was not dismissed. The lawyer for State Farm thereafter obtained a judgment against the debtor and had the debtor’s driver’s license suspended.
The court concluded that State Farm had actual knowledge of the debtor’s bankruptcy, and that the second claim had been discharged in the debtor’s bankruptcy. The court also found that the insurer was responsible for a willful violation of the discharge injunction when it failed to supervise the attorney acting as its agent or to notify him of the pending bankruptcy. The debtor was awarded $66,629.66 for lost wages, emotional distress, and the discomfort and costs associated with the loss of his driver’s license for almost six months.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C § 524 -- Discharge Injunction
Case Summary:
Trustee sought to avoid certain alleged fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 and 548. The corporate debtor made payments on the home mortgage of its sole principal and officer totaling some $14,000 over the four years prior to bankruptcy. The trustee contended that the debtor did not receive “reasonably equivalent value” for the transfers. The debtor’s principal argued that the payments were a portion of his compensation. In general, payments on behalf of a third party can be avoided in bankruptcy unless there was a clear benefit (or “value”) to the debtor. The principal took no salary or compensation from the debtor companies; the court concluded that the payments constituted a pattern of compensation and that the debtor received an “indirect benefit” from the payments.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 544 -- Trustee as Lien Creditor
11 U.S.C. § 548 -- Fraudulent Conveyance
Key Words:
Trustee as Lein Creditor
Fraudulent Conveyance
Case Summary:
Chapter 7 trustee brought action against defendant to recover alleged fraudulent transfer made by debtor. Creditor contended that she had invested some $700,000 in the debtor’s business ventures. The trustee sought to recover $957,000 in transfers. The court found that the trustee did not prove she recovered a $450,000 transfer. As to the remaining balance, the court concluded that she did provide “reasonably equivalent value” in the form of her investments. The fact that the debtor was apparently engaging in a fraudulent scheme did not preclude the defendant from asserting the right to recover her “investments.”
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 548 -- Fraudulent Conveyance
Key Terms:
Fraudulent Conveyance