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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay

In re Schmid, Case No. 10-12142-13 (09/05/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 09/05/2013

Case Summary:
The Debtor persistently sought, from a variety of procedural angles in state and federal court, a finding that the mortgage on her home was invalid. After the Court entered an order dismissing her adversary proceeding and denying her claim objection concerning her mortgage, the Debtor sought Rule 60 relief from the Court’s judgment. The Court found that the Debtor had failed to show the relevance of allegedly “newly discovered evidence,” the existence of any evidence of “fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct,” or the merit of her position that the court’s judgment was void. In light of these findings, and after concluding that the Debtor appeared to be using her motion for relief as a substitute for an appeal, the Court denied the motion. Affirmed by the District Court.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 -- Relief from Judgment or Order
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) -- Relief from Judgment or Order

Key Terms:
Relief from Judgment or Order

Esurance Insurance Company v. Jeffrey Scott Keesee (In re Keesee), Adv. No. 13-0019, Case No. 12-16788-7 (08/22/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 08/22/2013

Case Summary:
An insurance company sought a determination that the debt and accrued interest arising from a state court judgment related to the Debtor’s drunk driving conviction was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9). On summary judgment, the Court concluded there was no genuine dispute as to the relevant facts and that judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. The Court determined that both the state court judgment and post-judgment interest were nondischargeable. The Court specified, however, that the amounts were nondischargeable as to the Debtor alone and not to his co-debtor wife. In support of this finding, it noted that the adversary proceeding had been brought against only the Debtor, not his wife, and that in any event Wisconsin law protects the innocent spouse and her property from liability for her spouse’s torts.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) -- Nondischargeability - Drunk Driving
Wis. Stat. § 766.55(2) -- Marital Property

Key Terms:
Drunk Driving
Marital Property

In re Weiner, Case No. 11-17754-12 (08/22/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 08/22/2013

Case Summary:
The Chapter 12 standing trustee objected to confirmation of the debtor’s amended plan on the grounds that it impermissibly provided for direct payment of an impaired secured claim. The Court recognized a split of authority among the circuits, and no Seventh Circuit authority directly on point. After evaluating the two most prominent approaches—one which categorically prohibited the direct payment of impaired secured claims and the other that permitted direct payments under certain circumstances—the Court overruled the Trustee’s objection and confirmed the amended plan. The Court endorsed the thirteen-factor test set forth in In re Pianowski, 92 B.R. 225 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988), and concluded that proposals to make direct payments should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 1226(c) -- Payments

Key Terms:
Direct Payments

In re Devine, Case No. 08-15291-13 (07/15/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 07/15/2013

Case Summary:
Debtors' counsel filed an Application for Approval, Allowance and Payment of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as an Administrative Creditor seeking reimbursement for a total of 17 hours of work. An examination of the billing entries showed that the bulk of the work was performed in the course of representing the Debtors against small claims actions in state court. The Court acknowledged that the attempt to resolve the matters quickly and inexpensively in state court was a logical choice, but noted that opting not to remove the matters to the bankruptcy court entailed a risk of prolonged litigation. It ruled that the additional fees that resulted from complications in the state court should not be paid by the bankruptcy estate, and denied the balance of Debtors' counsel's request beyond the initial amount budgeted for "a single appearance followed, perhaps, by one brief."

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 330 -- Compensation of Professionals

Key Terms:
Attorney Fees

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, and Bank of America, N.A. v. AIG Federal Savings Bank, PNC Bank, N.A., HSBC Bank USA, and Paula Dean Laddusire (In re Laddusire), Adv. No. 13-0042, Case No. 12-16616-11 (06/20/2013) (494 B.R. 383) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 06/20/2013

Case Summary:
When the Debtor filed bankruptcy in December 2012, an action to foreclose on her home had been pending in Oneida County Circuit Court since January 2009. She removed the foreclosure action to the bankruptcy court, and Bank of America filed a Motion to Remand, Abstain, or Dismiss. After analyzing the impact of removal and remand on the foreclosure action and the bankruptcy case in light of a fourteen-item list of factors, the bankruptcy court concluded that "permissive" abstention was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).

Statute/Rule References:
28 U.S.C. § 1334 -- Abstention
28 U.S.C. § 1452 -- Removal
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9027 -- Removal

Key Terms:
Abstention
Removal

Paula Dean Laddusire v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company (In re Laddusire), Adv. No. 13-0043, Case No. 12-16616-11 (06/06/2013) (494 B.R. 373) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 06/06/2013

Case Summary:
The Debtor sued her insurance company in state court seeking payment for damage to her house under a homeowners insurance policy. Eighteen months after the state court action commenced, the Debtor filed her bankruptcy petition. Four months later, she sought to remove the case to the Bankruptcy Court. The insurance company filed a motion for abstention or remand. After analyzing the impact of removal and remand on the state court action and the bankruptcy case in light of a fourteen-item list of factors, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that "permissive" abstention was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).

Statute/Rule References:
28 U.S.C. § 1334 -- Abstention

Key Terms:
Abstention

Suzannah Meta Schmid v. Bank of America, N.A., and Associated Bank, N.A. (In re Schmid), Adv. No. 12-0160, Case No. 10-12142-13 (04/24/2013) (494 B.R. 737) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 04/24/2013

Case Summary:
The Debtor filed an adversary proceeding against Bank of America, the holder of her mortgage and note, seeking a determination that the bank lacked standing to foreclose. The bank filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Noting a final judgment of the Portage County Circuit Court on the issue of the ownership of the mortgage and note, the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Debtor's claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In the alternative, the Court ruled that the Debtor's claims were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. It also found that the Debtor's complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). The Debtor's motion to amend her complaint was therefore denied, and Bank of America's motion to dismiss was granted. Affirmed by the District Court.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) -- Failure to State a Claim

Key Terms:
Claims - Allowance
Rooker-Feldman

In re Isaacs, Case No. 12-12406-7 (04/11/2013) (491 B.R. 893) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 04/11/2013

Case Summary:
The Chapter 7 Trustee objected to the Debtors' claim of exemptions in an unimproved 21-acre parcel of land under Wis. Stat. § 815.20, the Wisconsin homestead exemption. The Trustee contended that the vacant land was not "reasonably necessary for the use of the dwelling as a home" as required by the statute. The parcel is adjacent to the parcel on which the Debtors' home sits. In response to the Trustee's objection, the Debtors argued that the vacant parcel was reasonably necessary to the homestead because it generates rental income and income from the sale of timber. In addition, the Debtors collect firewood, hunt, and hold family reunions on the parcel. They also receive tax benefits by participating in a Managed Forest Lands stewardship forestry plan. Acknowledging the strong Wisconsin policy favoring a debtor's right to claim a homestead exemption, the Court noted a line of cases that recognized a limit to that right. Interpreting the phrase "reasonably necessary for the use of the dwelling as a home," the Court distinguished between uses of the land that simply create some benefit, and uses that are truly necessary to the home. Applied here, the Court found that the Debtors' use of the vacant parcel was periodic and primarily recreational, and that the income generated from it was insufficient to be considered necessary. As a result, the Court concluded that the land was not reasonably necessary for the use of the dwelling as a home. The Trustee's objection was sustained.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) -- Exemptions - State-Law
Wis. Stat. § 815.20 -- Homestead Exemption

Key Terms:
Exemptions
Homestead Exemption

In re Saxe, Case No. 12-13807-7 (03/22/2013) (491 B.R. 244) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 03/22/2013

Case Summary:
Chapter 7 debtors sought to avoid a lien on various items of farm equipment. The creditor asserted that it had a purchase-money security interest in one item, a skidsteer. The Debtors disputed the existence of a PMSI, argued that there had been a novation, and that their payments on the debt should be applied first to the skidsteer (such that the PMSI was paid, and the remaining obligation was a general security interest). The Bankruptcy Court found that the security agreement created a PMSI. The subsequent renewal of the loan did not constitute a novation, as the differences between the two notes were minimal, no additional funds were borrowed, and there was no indication that the original obligation was extinguished. Finally, under Wisconsin law regarding the application of payments, payments are applied first to obligations secured by purchase-money security interests only if “more than one obligation is secured.” Here, there was only one obligation, and payments would be applied to the whole debt (and the PMSI would be removed only after the entire debt has been satisfied). The motion to avoid the lien was denied as to the skidsteer.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) -- Lien Avoidance
Wis. Stat. § 409.103 -- Purchase - Money Security Interest

Key Terms:
Lien Avoidance
Purchase - Money Security Interest

In re Spencer, Case No. 10-15242-7 (02/12/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 02/12/2013

Case Summary:
After receiving a discharge, the Debtor sought to reopen her bankruptcy case in order to administer assets, amend her schedules, and have her case administered “on the basis of true facts.” She had been contesting the foreclosure of the mortgage on her home in Wood County Circuit Court for nearly four years, and had recently filed a Notice of Removal of that action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The Debtor’s motion to reopen her bankruptcy case alleged that she expected a recovery against PNC Bank for fraud and violations of several state and federal laws related to the foreclosure proceeding. She believed that these assets should be made available to her creditors. Citing Redmond v. Fifth Third Bank, 624 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2010), the court held that the Debtor’s motion was untimely, that it appeared highly unlikely she was entitled to bankruptcy relief, and that either the state court or the district court were the appropriate fora for her action.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 350(b) -- Reopening

Key Terms:
Reopening

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