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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay

Patricia Mroczenski v. Larry Dennis Mroczenski and Tami Jo Mroczenski (In re Mroczenski), Adv. No. 13-0058, Case No. 12-16800-7 (12/16/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 12/16/2013

Case Summary:
The plaintiff in this adversary proceeding—the incapacitated mother of one of the Defendants/Co-Debtors—secured a $60,000 state court judgment against her son and his wife for breach of fiduciary duties, conversion, and defalcation and sought a determination that the amounts owed were nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). The Court found that the language of the state court judgment conclusively established that the Plaintiff’s son had engaged in “fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity” and that his debt should be nondischargeable; however, the judgment was not clear regarding his wife’s culpability. Accordingly, summary judgment was granted as to the son but denied as to his wife.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud or Defalcation in Fiduciary Capacity

Key Terms:
Claim Preclusion
Fiduciary Capacity

Erie Insurance Company and Anthony Stafford v. Kevin John Zaja (In re Zaja), Adv. No. 13-0060, Case No. 13-10684-7 (12/12/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 12/12/2013

Case Summary:
The Plaintiffs obtained a state court judgment against the Debtor for stealing a trailer and two automotive hoists and sought a finding that the consequent debt was nondischargeable as larceny under 11 U.S.C. § 532(a)(4). On summary judgment, the Court found that the terms of the state court judgment conclusively established that the Debtor committed larceny for purposes of section 523(a)(4). Accordingly, summary judgment was granted in favor of the Plaintiffs and the debt was rendered nondischargeable.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud in Fiduciary Capacity

Key Terms:
Collateral Estoppel
Larceny

Steven John Wlodyga and Linda Wlodyga v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., and Chase Home Finance, LLC (In re Wlodyga), Adv. No. 13-0001, Case No. 12-15455-7 (11/25/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 11/25/2013

Case Summary:
Chapter 7 debtors brought an adversary proceeding seeking a determination that the junior mortgage on their home was invalid. The Debtors argued that although they both signed the promissory note—and although they acknowledge they received and spent the loan proceeds—one of the debtors did not remember signing the mortgage and, as a result, either the signature that appeared on the mortgage was a forgery or the result of misrepresentation and fraud. Despite its skepticism of the Debtors’ “obviously self-serving” representations, the Court concluded that the ultimate factual question turned on a credibility assessment that could only be made in person. Accordingly, it denied summary judgment and set the matter for trial.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056 -- Summary Judgment
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) -- Summary Judgment

Key Terms:
Summary Judgment

James Richard Thoen v. Kathleen E. Kevan (In re Kevan), Adv. No. 12-0220, Case No. 12-14575-7 (09/23/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 09/23/2013

Case Summary:
The Plaintiff filed an adversary complaint seeking a determination that a Minnesota state court punitive damages award was nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Under Minnesota law, punitive damages are available if a plaintiff shows a defendant acted with a deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others, acting with intent or indifference. By contrast, section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove the debtor acted in conscious disregard of her duties and intended to injure the creditor or was substantially certain injury would occur. Looking at a special verdict without the jury instructions and the state court record, the court had no basis to determine whether the jury concluded the defendant acted willfully and maliciously. The jury answered "yes" to the question of whether the defendant acted "with deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others." It could have found that the defendant acted with reckless disregard, which is insufficient to demonstrate willfulness and maliciousness under section 523(a)(6). Therefore, the court denied both motions for summary judgment.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - Willful and Malicious Injury

Key Terms:
Collateral Estoppel
Willful and Malicious - Defined

In re Schmid, Case No. 10-12142-13 (09/05/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 09/05/2013

Case Summary:
The Debtor persistently sought, from a variety of procedural angles in state and federal court, a finding that the mortgage on her home was invalid. After the Court entered an order dismissing her adversary proceeding and denying her claim objection concerning her mortgage, the Debtor sought Rule 60 relief from the Court’s judgment. The Court found that the Debtor had failed to show the relevance of allegedly “newly discovered evidence,” the existence of any evidence of “fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct,” or the merit of her position that the court’s judgment was void. In light of these findings, and after concluding that the Debtor appeared to be using her motion for relief as a substitute for an appeal, the Court denied the motion. Affirmed by the District Court.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 -- Relief from Judgment or Order
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) -- Relief from Judgment or Order

Key Terms:
Relief from Judgment or Order

Esurance Insurance Company v. Jeffrey Scott Keesee (In re Keesee), Adv. No. 13-0019, Case No. 12-16788-7 (08/22/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 08/22/2013

Case Summary:
An insurance company sought a determination that the debt and accrued interest arising from a state court judgment related to the Debtor’s drunk driving conviction was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9). On summary judgment, the Court concluded there was no genuine dispute as to the relevant facts and that judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. The Court determined that both the state court judgment and post-judgment interest were nondischargeable. The Court specified, however, that the amounts were nondischargeable as to the Debtor alone and not to his co-debtor wife. In support of this finding, it noted that the adversary proceeding had been brought against only the Debtor, not his wife, and that in any event Wisconsin law protects the innocent spouse and her property from liability for her spouse’s torts.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) -- Nondischargeability - Drunk Driving
Wis. Stat. § 766.55(2) -- Marital Property

Key Terms:
Drunk Driving
Marital Property

In re Weiner, Case No. 11-17754-12 (08/22/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 08/22/2013

Case Summary:
The Chapter 12 standing trustee objected to confirmation of the debtor’s amended plan on the grounds that it impermissibly provided for direct payment of an impaired secured claim. The Court recognized a split of authority among the circuits, and no Seventh Circuit authority directly on point. After evaluating the two most prominent approaches—one which categorically prohibited the direct payment of impaired secured claims and the other that permitted direct payments under certain circumstances—the Court overruled the Trustee’s objection and confirmed the amended plan. The Court endorsed the thirteen-factor test set forth in In re Pianowski, 92 B.R. 225 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988), and concluded that proposals to make direct payments should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 1226(c) -- Payments

Key Terms:
Direct Payments

In re Devine, Case No. 08-15291-13 (07/15/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 07/15/2013

Case Summary:
Debtors' counsel filed an Application for Approval, Allowance and Payment of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as an Administrative Creditor seeking reimbursement for a total of 17 hours of work. An examination of the billing entries showed that the bulk of the work was performed in the course of representing the Debtors against small claims actions in state court. The Court acknowledged that the attempt to resolve the matters quickly and inexpensively in state court was a logical choice, but noted that opting not to remove the matters to the bankruptcy court entailed a risk of prolonged litigation. It ruled that the additional fees that resulted from complications in the state court should not be paid by the bankruptcy estate, and denied the balance of Debtors' counsel's request beyond the initial amount budgeted for "a single appearance followed, perhaps, by one brief."

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 330 -- Compensation of Professionals

Key Terms:
Attorney Fees

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, and Bank of America, N.A. v. AIG Federal Savings Bank, PNC Bank, N.A., HSBC Bank USA, and Paula Dean Laddusire (In re Laddusire), Adv. No. 13-0042, Case No. 12-16616-11 (06/20/2013) (494 B.R. 383) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 06/20/2013

Case Summary:
When the Debtor filed bankruptcy in December 2012, an action to foreclose on her home had been pending in Oneida County Circuit Court since January 2009. She removed the foreclosure action to the bankruptcy court, and Bank of America filed a Motion to Remand, Abstain, or Dismiss. After analyzing the impact of removal and remand on the foreclosure action and the bankruptcy case in light of a fourteen-item list of factors, the bankruptcy court concluded that "permissive" abstention was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).

Statute/Rule References:
28 U.S.C. § 1334 -- Abstention
28 U.S.C. § 1452 -- Removal
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9027 -- Removal

Key Terms:
Abstention
Removal

Paula Dean Laddusire v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company (In re Laddusire), Adv. No. 13-0043, Case No. 12-16616-11 (06/06/2013) (494 B.R. 373) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 06/06/2013

Case Summary:
The Debtor sued her insurance company in state court seeking payment for damage to her house under a homeowners insurance policy. Eighteen months after the state court action commenced, the Debtor filed her bankruptcy petition. Four months later, she sought to remove the case to the Bankruptcy Court. The insurance company filed a motion for abstention or remand. After analyzing the impact of removal and remand on the state court action and the bankruptcy case in light of a fourteen-item list of factors, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that "permissive" abstention was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).

Statute/Rule References:
28 U.S.C. § 1334 -- Abstention

Key Terms:
Abstention

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