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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay

Cerny, et al. v. Old National Bank, et al. (In re Cerny), Adv. No. 24-00061, Case No. 24-10322-13 (03/21/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 03/21/2025

Case Summary:
Debtors Gary and Barbara Cerny filed a pro se action against their mortgage lender, Old National Bank; Old National's state court lawyers, Eckberg Lammers, P.C.; and State Court Judge Jeffrey S. Kuglitsch over a July 2023 foreclosure judgment. Plaintiffs argued that Old National wasn't the proper holder of their mortgage, and thus the foreclosure judgment should be declared null and void. They also alleged violations of the Uniform Commercial Code and the United States Constitution. Each Defendant moved to dismiss the case based on various theories, which the Court granted. First, this Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, along with principles of full faith and credit, and claim and issue preclusion. Next, although the complaint alleged fraud, it failed to state allegations of fraud with particularity and thus couldn't withstand Defendants' motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Plaintiffs' claims that Old National wasn't the proper holder of the note under the U.C.C. were also without merit. Finally, even if this Court had jurisdiction to hear the complaint, Judge Kuglitsch would be immune from liability in both his professional and personal capacities.

Key Terms:
Full Faith and Credit
Judicial Immunity
Jurisdiction
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Statute/Rule References:
28 U.S.C. § 157 -- Jurisdiction
28 U.S.C. § 1334 -- Bankruptcy cases and proceedings
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) -- Failure to state a claim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) -- Fraud or mistake

Heyerholm, et al. v. Johnson, et al. (In re Johnson), Adv. No. 22-00049, Case No. 22-11548-7 (3/4/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 03/04/2025

Case Summary:
The District Court remanded this case to apply the appropriate standard for “maliciousness” under Code section 523(a)(6). This Court decided that Defendants' actions weren't malicious because there was no evidence that they consciously disregarded their duty, or that their actions lacked just cause or excuse. Since this Court had initially made an oral ruling, the decision began by itemizing specific findings of fact from trial. This Court then determined that the nature of the duty to be examined was relevant because, even though this Court already found Defendants' actions to be willful, the facts initially determined at trial would not have necessarily been sufficient to find that an intentional tort had occurred. Next, Defendants' actions weren't malicious because there was no evidence that they consciously disregarded their duty of care. The record showed that alleged mechanical issues with their boat were infrequent, and that the issue that occurred on the day Plaintiff was injured was new and unpredictable. Thus, their assumption that the boat would operate as normal was reasonable. Defendant was also attempting to align his conduct with his duty by moving the boat away from Plaintiff when the accident occurred. Plaintiffs also failed to establish a clear ordinary standard of care that Defendants allegedly violated. Finally, the record showed that Defendants acted with just cause and excuse because they were attempting to move the boat away from Plaintiff in an effort to prevent harm.

Statute Reference:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - willful and malicious injury

Key Terms:
Duty
Nondischargeability
Remand
Willful and Malicious Injury

In re Conway, Case No. 24-10126-7 (1/22/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 01/22/2025

Case Summary:
Debtors moved to approve settlement with a creditor, proposing to pay the creditor from proceeds held in escrow held by a title company. The settlement required the Debtors to convert their case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, and to treat the creditor as a secured claimant in the Chapter 13 plan. But before conversion, the Chapter 7 Trustee of the Debtors’ estate filed an adversary proceeding seeking a determination that the creditor was unsecured. The Court ruled in the Trustee’s favor. Thus, the Court then denied the Debtors’ motion to approve settlement because the Court had already determined that the creditor was unsecured, and because the Debtors couldn’t settle claims using estate property.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 541 -- Property of the Estate
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a) -- Compromise or Settlement

Key Terms:
Property of the Estate
Settlement

Brian A. Hart, Chapter 7 Trustee v. Greenwich Business Capital, LLC (In re Conway), Adv. No. 24-00034, Case No. 24-10126-7 (12/19/2024) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 12/19/2024

Case Summary:
Chapter 7 Trustee Brian Hart moved for summary judgment seeking to avoid a lien claimed by Defendant Greenwich Business Capital. Alternatively, Trustee Hart requested an order that any potential lien would be an avoidable preference. The Court granted his motion. The parties stipulated that Defendant failed to docket a foreign judgment on the Dane County judgment and lien docket before the Debtors sold their real property in that county. Thus, by operation of Wisconsin statute, the Defendant did not have a lien on the property when it was sold. Nonetheless, Defendant argued that since it filed a UCC financing statement with the register of deeds, it should be afforded an equitable lien. But the Court disagreed – Defendant could not invoke equity to protect its alleged interest when the statutory procedure for obtaining a lien was available to it. Also, any equitable interest could not defeat the interest of a Chapter 7 trustee, who is treated as a properly secured judgment lien creditor under the Code. Finally, the Court agreed with Trustee Hart that, to the extent that a later-filed foreign judgment case filed by Defendant gave it an interest in proceeds from the sale of the property, such an interest would be an avoidable preference.

Statutes/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 544 -- Lien avoidance
11 U.S.C. § 547 -- Preferences
Wis. Stat. § 409.102 -- Definition of “secured party”
Wis. Stat. § 806.15 -- Lien of judgment; priority

Key Terms:
Avoidance
Equitable Lien
Foreign Judgment
Judgment Lien
Preference

In re Sloniker, Case No. 24-11196-7 (12/12/2024) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 12/12/2024

Case Summary:
Debtors filed an “Affidavit in Support” containing several requests. One of the requests was that the Chapter 7 Trustee in their case be removed due to an alleged conflict of interest. The United States Trustee objected to the removal of the Trustee, and the Court scheduled a hearing for December 3. The scheduling order provided that any supplement to Debtors’ response was due on November 25. No response or supplement was filed. At the December 3 hearing, Mrs. Sloniker requested that the hearing be canceled or rescheduled, which the Court denied. The Court denied the Debtors’ request to remove the Trustee. Bankruptcy trustees have duties outlined in Code section 704 and can only be removed for “cause” under section 324. The Debtors fail to state any cause for removal other than conclusory allegations that there was a conflict of interest. Debtors further requested that the Court grant the Debtors time to file a complaint with the Office of Lawyer Regulation. The Court explained that it lacked jurisdiction over that claim.

Statutes and Rules:
11 U.S.C. § 324 -- Removal of Trustee
11 U.S.C. § 704 -- Duties of Trustee
28 U.S.C. § 157 -- Jurisdiction
28 U.S.C. § 1334 -- Bankruptcy Cases and Proceedings

Key Terms:
Jurisdiction
Removal of Trustee

In re Cerny, Case No. 24-10322-13 (11/12/2024) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 11/12/2024

Case Summary:
Though represented by an attorney, Debtors filed two pro se motions requesting various relief, including a motion to stay plan payments and administration, a claim objection, a motion to avoid a lien, and a request for an emergency hearing. The Court summarily denied the motions on several grounds. First, neither motion was accompanied by a notice or opportunity for objection. Second, the request for emergency hearing was not warranted; the basis for the emergency request was that plan payments should not continue until a purported claim objection and lien avoidance disputes are resolved. But the Court reasoned that claim objections and lien avoidance motions are somewhat routine, and other creditors should not be prejudiced by delay in administration simply because the Debtors had a dispute with their mortgage holder. Third, both motions suffered service deficiencies. The certificates of service were unsigned and failed to specify which documents were served, who served them, or by what means. Finally, the Court noted that there were substantive deficiencies, including citations to the federal criminal code, state medical assistance procedures, and the U.C.C., all of which were irrelevant or beyond the scope of the requested relief.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 -- Time
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 -- Signing of Papers
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014 -- Contested Matters

Key Terms:
Notice
Relevance
Service

Judge Rachel M. Blise

In re Bizeau, Case No. 24-11074 (03/21/2025) -- Judge Rachel M. Blise 03/21/2025

Case Summary:
After the United States Trustee (UST) moved to dismiss the debtor's chapter 7 case on the grounds that there was a presumption of abuse under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), the debtor amended his schedules to include a $425,088.66 non-consumer debt owed to the SBA Disaster Loan Servicing Center. The SBA Debt was based on a guarantee signed by the debtor's non-filing spouse for a loan related to her insurance business. With the additional obligation added to his scheduled debts, the debtor certified that his debts were not primarily consumer debts and he was not subject to any presumption of abuse in § 707(b). The UST then argued that neither the debtor nor his property were liable for the SBA Debt because the debtor's non-filing spouse received a chapter 7 discharge in late 2023. Although the debtor did not sign the SBA loan documents, he argued that he and/or his property were liable for the debt under Wisconsin law. The Court concluded that the debtor was not personally liable to the SBA because he did not sign or otherwise agree to be bound by the loan documents evidencing the SBA Debt and no other statute or law made him personally liable for the debt; the debtor's individual property could not be used to satisfy the SBA Debt because he was not an incurring or obligated spouse; and the debtor's marital property could not be used to satisfy the SBA Debt because the discharge injunction entered in his non-filing spouse's case prevented collection of the SBA Debt from the couple's marital property. Because the SBA did not have a right to payment from the debtor or any of his property, the SBA did not have a claim in the debtor's case and the SBA Debt was not properly included on the debtor's schedules. Without the SBA Debt, the debtor's debts were “primarily consumer debts,” and the debtor was subject to the requirements of § 707(b).

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)
Wis. Stat. § 766.55

Key Terms:
Motion to Dismiss
Primarily Consumer Debts
Marital Property Act

Badalov, et al. v. Buzhunashvili et al (In re Buzhunashvili, et al.), Adv. Case No. 24-00054, Case No. 24-10209-7 (02/06/2025) -- Judge Rachel M. Blise 02/06/2025

Case Summary:
The plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding requesting a declaration of nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and seeking relief on three related counts. The debtor answered the complaint, but the joint debtor moved to dismiss the claims against her, arguing that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged the existence of an underlying debt. The plaintiffs argued in response that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S. 69 (2023), rendered the debt nondischargeable based on the agency relationship between the debtor and the joint debtor. The Court granted the motion to dismiss. The Court held that a claim under § 523(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to support the existence of an underlying debt, in addition to facts sufficient to support the elements of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2). In Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, a state court had already determined that the joint debtor was liable on an underlying debt, and the issue was whether the debt could be nondischargeable if the joint debtor was not the primary fraudster. In this case, in contrast, there was no determination as to the existence of an underlying prepetition debt, and the plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts to establish that the joint debtor was liable to the plaintiffs on a prepetition debt.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) - Nondischargeability
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) - Motion to Dismiss

Key Terms:
Motion to Dismiss
Nondischargeable Debt

James V. Block, Chapter 7 Trustee v. Bernard Charles Seidling, et al. (In re Seidling), Adv. No. 23-00032, Case No. 22-11191-7 (08/23/2024) -- Judge Rachel M. Blise 08/23/2024

Case Summary:
The Chapter 7 Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against 83 trusts and entities, seeking a declaration that certain property was property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541. The Debtor had a real estate business that involved purchasing distressed real estate and either selling it at a profit, leasing it to a third party, or entering into some other contractual arrangement. The Debtor structured his business through a web of trusts, partnerships, sole proprietorships, and other entities. The Trustee contended that the real estate, contracts, bank accounts, and other related assets held in the name of the trusts and entities were wholly owned and solely controlled by the Debtor, and that it was all property of the bankruptcy estate. After a five-day trial, the Court found that the assets held by 77 of the trusts and entities named in the Trustee’s complaint were property of the bankruptcy estate. The Court determined that any assets owned by the debtor under a fictitious name, a “d/b/a,” or a sole proprietorship were not held by a separate legal person and were therefore property of the estate. In addition, the Court concluded that the trustee could reach the assets of the trusts because none of the trusts was validly created; even if the trusts were valid, the Debtor had the power to revoke the trusts; and the trusts were alter egos of the Debtor. The Court also determined that the partnership form could be disregarded because the partnerships were the alter egos of the Debtor and the Debtor used the entities to shield assets from his creditors.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 541

Key Terms:
Property of the Estate
Sole Proprietorship
Partnership
Trust Property
Revocability of Trusts
Piercing of Trust Form

Diana Cannon v. Andrew M. Johnson (In re Johnson), Adv. No. 23-00041, Case No. 23-11365-7 (07/25/2024) -- Judge Rachel M. Blise 07/25/2024

Case Summary:
The Court granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s adversary complaint.  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant fraudulently induced her to invest in his company and that the debt owed to her as a result was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), (a)(6), and (a)(19).  The Court denied the motion to dismiss as to the claims under §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) after concluding the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the defendant made false representations to her that she relied on to her detriment.  The Court dismissed the claim under § 523(a)(4) because the plaintiff had not pleaded facts sufficient to establish that the defendant was acting as a fiduciary.  Finally, the Court denied the motion as to the claim under § 523(a)(19).  The plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the defendant violated Wisconsin state securities laws, based in part on a Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions consent order.  The Court also concluded that the plain language of § 523(a)(19)(B) allows a bankruptcy court to enter the order or judgment required to render a debt for violation of securities laws to be nondischargeable.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)

Key Terms:
Nondischargeable
Fraud

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