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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay

CivilGEO, Inc., v. Hiscox Insurance Company, Inc., and Eternix, Ltd. (In re CivilGEO, Inc.), Adv. 25-00019, Case No. 25-10731-11 (5/8/2026) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 05/08/2026

Case Summary:

Plaintiff CivilGEO, Inc., and Defendant Hiscox Insurance Company, Inc., cross-moved for summary judgment. The core issue underlying the motions was whether there was insurance coverage under a policy insuring Plaintiff. Plaintiff is a defendant in a District Court action against Eternix, Ltd. Plaintiff expected Defendant insurance company to defend against the claims asserted in the District Court action. Defendant refused. Plaintiff later filed a complaint in this Court asserting Defendant breached its duty to defend. The Court ruled that at least one allegation was covered within the policy’s coverage. Under Wisconsin insurance law, one claim within policy coverage is sufficient to trigger an insurer’s duty to defend the entire suit. Plaintiff’s motion was granted.

Statute/Rule References:

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056 – Summary judgment
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 – Summary judgment

Key Terms:

Insurer’s Duty to Defend
Summary Judgment
Wisconsin Insurance Law

In re Sparhawk LLC, et al., Case No. 26-10527-11 (04/24/2026) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 04/24/2026

Case Summary:

Permissive abstention was unwarranted following Debtors’ removal from a state court receivership related to a business relationship with their Creditor, WoodTrust Bank. Four Debtors separately filed voluntary petitions under Chapter 11. Debtors each operated different facets of a transportation and logistical business. The cases were jointly administered thereafter. Creditor moved for entry of an order abstaining from and dismissing the cases. Debtors objected. Numerous factors weighed in favor of denying abstention. Creditor’s motion was denied.

Statute/Rule Reference:

28 U.S.C. § 1334 – Abstention

Key Term:

Abstention

In re Sparhawk LLC, et at., Case No. 26-10527-11 (04/24/2026) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 04/24/2026

Case Summary:

Four Debtors each filed voluntary petitions under Chapter 11. Debtors operated different facets of the same transportation and logistical business. The cases were jointly administered thereafter. Creditor WoodTrust Bank moved to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee. Under section 1104(a)(2), the Court found an appointment of a trustee was in the best interests of creditors, equity security holders, and other interests of the estate. Creditor’s motion was granted.

Statute/Rule Reference:

11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) – Appointment of a Trustee     

Key Term:

Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee

Gary O. Cerny and Barbara M. Cerny v. Old National Bank, Judge Jeffrey S. Kuglitsch, and Eckberg Lammers, P.C. (In re Cerny), Adv. No. 24-00061, Case No. 24-10322-13 (01/28/2026) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 01/28/2026

Case Summary:

Plaintiffs Gary and Barbara Cerny moved for relief from a judgment. Plaintiffs asked the Court to vacate its decision and reopen an adversary proceeding against Old National Bank, Judge Jeffrey S. Kuglitsch, and the law firm Eckberg Lammers, P.C. The Court initially dismissed Plaintiffs’ adversary proceeding because their complaint sought review of a state court foreclosure judgment. The Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Plaintiffs sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then appealed. The District Court affirmed the dismissal. In their motion for relief from judgment, Plaintiffs did not provide new grounds for relief and repeated prior arguments. The Court found there was no basis under Rule 60 to reconsider and vacate its decision and prior order dismissing the adversary proceeding. The Court reiterated it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and was bound to give preclusive effect to the state court judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Act. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion.

Statute/Rule References:

Fed. R. Bankr. 9024 -- Relief from Judgment or Order
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) -- Relief from a Judgment or Order

Key Terms:

Full Faith and Credit
Judicial Immunity
Jurisdiction
Reconsideration
Rooker-Feldman

In re: Sukowatey, Case No. 25-11435-13 (11/26/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 11/26/2025

Case Summary:
Creditor Town of Warren (the "Town") filed a motion for determination of the inapplicability of the automatic stay or, in the alternative, for relief fro the automatic stay. The basis for the Town's motion was en enforcement of raze orders against two parcels of adjacent real estate owned by the Debtors. The Town argued that enforcement of the raze orders fell within the police and regulatory power exception under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). The Debtors conceded that razing one property, a residential property, as appropriate. So, the Court's analysis focused on whether section 362(b)(4) authorized the Town to proceed with razing the other property, a commercial property. The Court held that the Town has failed, so far, to prove the raze order with respect to the commercial property is a valid exercise of the Town's police and regulatory power under § 362(b)(4). The Court found that the Town failed to show that its actions effectuate public policy rather than adjudicate private rights. Further, the Court noted that the record suggested the Town sought to protect a pecuniary governmental interest in commercial property rather than to protect the public health and safety. As for the Town's alternative request for relief from the automatic stay, the Court concluded that there are material facts in dispute. Accordingly, the Court ruled that further evidentiary proceedings are required to determine whether to grant relief from stay. 

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) -- Automatic Stay
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) -- Police and Regulatory Power Exception to the Automatic Stay
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) -- Relief from the Automatic Stay
Wis. Stat. § 66.0413(1) -- Razing Buildings

Key Terms:
Automatic Stay
Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay
Police and Regulatory Power Exception
Raze Order

In re McNall, Case No. 25-10375-7 (10/22/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 10/22/2025

Case Summary:
Creditor North American Banking Company (“NABC”) moved to extend the deadline to object to the Debtors’ discharge in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. NABC based its request on certain collateral for which it had received relief from the automatic stay to repossess on May 22, 2025. However, Batavia Leasing Company (“Batavia”), another creditor, had obtained relief from the stay to repossess the same collateral on May 21. The deadline to object to the discharge expired on May 23. NABC filed a secured proof of claim on June 23. NABC claimed that on June 25, it discovered Batavia asserted an ownership interest in the collateral which the Debtors had already surrendered to Batavia. NABC did not file its motion to extend the objection deadline to the discharge until July 29. The Debtors objected to NABC’s motion. Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(a), 4004(b)(2), and 4007(c), the Court held that NABC was not entitled to an extension. The Court found that NABC was aware of the need to seek an extension and that nothing prevented NABC from filing a motion for an extension before the May 23 deadline. The Court also noted NABC did not file its motion for relief from stay until two-and-a-half months after the February petition date. Rejecting NABC’s argument that it was entitled to equitable tolling, the Court concluded that NABC failed to show it diligently pursued its rights or that some extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. Hence, the Court denied NABC’s motion to extend time to object to the discharge.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R.  Bankr. P. 4004(a) — Time for Objection to Discharge
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(b)(2) — Extension of Time
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c) — Time for Filing Complaint under § 523(c)

Key Terms:
Extension
Filing Complaint
Objection to Discharge

Judge Rachel M. Blise

In re Maeder, Case No. 25-11928-13 (04/23/2026) -- Judge Rachel M. Blise 04/23/2026

Case Summary:
Creditor Eternix Ltd. and the United States trustee filed motions under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) to convert the chapter 13 case to chapter 7.  The court found that the debtor engineered the bankruptcy filing to avoid paying his only creditor, Eternix, which filed a claim based on copyright infringement.  The debtor took great care to pay all his other creditors before filing; he admitted that the only reason for his bankruptcy filing was to avoid the Eternix debt; he engaged in extensive pre-bankruptcy planning in an attempt to shield assets from Eternix, while using those same assets to pay all of his other creditors; he failed to report gifts on his bankruptcy schedules; he manipulated his bankruptcy schedules and his proposed chapter 13 plan in an effort to leave as little money as possible for Eternix; and he valued his civil engineering software company at $0 despite privately asserting that the company was worth millions.  Applying the Seventh Circuit’s precedent in In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1992), the court considered the totality of the circumstances to conclude that the debtor did not file chapter 13 bankruptcy in good faith.  The court further determined that conversion was in the best interests of the bankruptcy estate and the estate’s only creditor.
 
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) 

Key Terms:
Motion to Dismiss or Convert
Totality of Circumstances
Good Faith

Badalov v. Buzhunashvili (In re Buzhunashvili), Adv. No. 24-00054, Case No. 24-10209-7 (03/27/2026) -- Judge Rachel M. Blise 03/27/2026

Case Summary:
The plaintiffs filed an adversary complaint against the debtor-defendants seeking to have a claim for fraud declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). The plaintiffs alleged that the debtor-defendants made misrepresentations in connection with the plaintiffs' investments in a restaurant business owned by the debtor-defendant husband. The Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. None of the statements that the plaintiffs relied on were actionable misrepresentations under Wisconsin law, so there was no underlying debt for the Court to declare nondischargeable. The defendants’ statements regarding the business’s prospects were non-actionable puffery, and the plaintiffs did not present evidence that they reasonably relied on the statements. In addition, the defendants' oral statements regarding the restaurant's financial condition could not support a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A). Without an underlying debt or written statements regarding financial condition, the plaintiffs could not establish the required elements of their § 523(a)(2)(A) claim, and the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056
 
Key Terms:
Summary Judgment
Nondischargeable Debt

In re Seidling, Case No. 22-11191-7 (03/18/2026) -- Judge Ranchel M. Blise 03/18/2026

Case Summary:
The chapter 7 Debtor purchased real property from one of five heirs of the claimant’s Estate. The Estate filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case asserting that the debtor was liable for civil theft and sought the value of the property, plus punitive damages and attorney’s fees and costs. The Estate contended that the heir’s transfer of the property to herself through a Transfer by Affidavit was invalid, as was the heir’s transfer of the property from herself to the Debtor. The Debtor’s objection to the claim presented the legal issues whether a single heir can use the Transfer by Affidavit procedure outlined in section 867.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes to take legal title to real property and whether that heir can transfer the real property to a third party. The Court concluded that the Transfer by Affidavit was valid under section 867.03, and that the heir had the ability to transfer the property at issue to the Debtor. Therefore, because the Debtor was not liable for civil theft under the theory presented by the Estate, and the Estate’s claim was disallowed.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 502
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f)
Wis. Stat. § 857.01
Wis. Stat. § 867.03

Key Terms:
Motion to Dismiss
Property of Estate

In re Ulness, Case No. 23-11345-13 (02/11/2026) -- Judge Rachel M. Blise 02/11/2026

Case Summary:
The chapter 13 debtor received an inheritance more than 180 days after the petition date but well before all payments under the plan were completed.  The chapter 13 trustee argued that the debtor's inheritance was property of the estate under § 1306(a)(1) because it was property that the debtor acquired after the commencement of the case but before the case was closed, and that a plan modification to provide an additional dividend to unsecured creditors was required.  The debtor argued that § 1306(a)(1) could not draw into the estate any inheritance a debtor receives or obtains the right to receive more than 180 days post-petition, by virtue of the time-limiting language in § 541(a)(5), so she was not required to use the inheritance to pay unsecured creditors.  The court held that an inheritance received more than 180 days after the petition date can be property of the bankruptcy estate under § 1306(a)(1), and the plan may be modified to account for the inheritance.  The court did not determine whether any particular modification of the plan was appropriate because no modified plan had yet been proposed.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)
11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1)

Key Terms:
Motion to Dismiss
Property of Estate

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