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Opinions
The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.
Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.
For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.
Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay
Case Summary:
In 2018, the Court entered an order denying Debtor’s discharge in connection with an adversary proceeding brought by the United States Trustee. Debtor’s case was closed in 2020. Five years later, Debtor sought to reopen his case to stay a scheduled sheriff’s sale of his home, and moved to do so on an expedited basis. Debtor alleged that recently revealed perjury and malfeasance of a business associate exonerated the Debtor and entitled him to relief from the order denying his discharge. The Court denied his motion. The alleged perjury of Debtor’s business associate was covered at trial and addressed in the Court’s decision denying Debtor’s discharge. No new facts or evidence were sufficiently introduced to warrant reopening Debtor’s case, let alone vacating the decision denying his discharge. Further, Debtor’s stated reason for reopening his case was simply for the benefit of the automatic stay to halt the scheduled sheriff’s sale of his home.
In 2018, the Court entered an order denying Debtor’s discharge in connection with an adversary proceeding brought by the United States Trustee. Debtor’s case was closed in 2020. Five years later, Debtor sought to reopen his case to stay a scheduled sheriff’s sale of his home, and moved to do so on an expedited basis. Debtor alleged that recently revealed perjury and malfeasance of a business associate exonerated the Debtor and entitled him to relief from the order denying his discharge. The Court denied his motion. The alleged perjury of Debtor’s business associate was covered at trial and addressed in the Court’s decision denying Debtor’s discharge. No new facts or evidence were sufficiently introduced to warrant reopening Debtor’s case, let alone vacating the decision denying his discharge. Further, Debtor’s stated reason for reopening his case was simply for the benefit of the automatic stay to halt the scheduled sheriff’s sale of his home.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 350(b) -- Reopening
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c) -- Reduction of time
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 -- Relief from a Judgment or Order
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 – Relief from a Judgment or Order
Key Terms:
Motion to Reopen
Motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order
Motion to Expedite
Denial of Discharge
Case Summary:
Chapter 7 Trustee sued alleged recipients of prepetition inheritance and other funds. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement. The Court denied Defendants’ motion. The Chapter 7 Trustee adequately pled the material facts of the disputed transactions sufficient to put Defendants on notice of the disputed act. The Trustee’s complaint included the amount of the funds, to whom they were transferred, and when, along with a legally sufficient claim for relief to avoid the transfers.
Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) -- Failure to state a claim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) -- Motion for a more definite statement
Key Terms:
Avoidance
Motion for a More Definite Statement
Motion to Dismiss
Case Summary:
Debtors William and Lisa Mossuto sought to estimate the claim of creditor CRS Properties, LLC. CRS obtained a prepetition foreclosure judgment in state court. Debtors appealed the judgment and filed their Chapter 13 petition before the redemption period expired. In their bankruptcy case, Debtors objected to CRS’s claim and requested this Court estimate the claim for the purposes of plan confirmation and a pending motion for relief from the automatic stay. In response, CRS pointed to the state court judgment and requested this Court to adopt the value of the judgment as the correct and allowed amount of its claim. This Court agreed with CRS. The first issue was whether Rooker-Feldman barred this Court from reviewing the judgment, which this Court found it didn’t since the judgment had been appealed. But secondly, the doctrine of claim preclusion obliged this Court to give preclusive effect to the foreclosure judgment since there was an identity of the parties, an identity of the claims, and the judgment constituted a final judgment on the merits. Further, although Debtors argued that the value of their property was lower than the filed secured claim of CRS, they offered no evidence in support of their alleged valuation. Thus, the Court allowed CRS’s secured claim in the amount filed.
Statute References:
11 U.S.C. § 502 -- Allowance of claims or interests
28 U.S.C. § 1738 -- State and Territorial statutes and judicial proceedings; full faith and credit
Key Terms:
Claim Estimation
Claim Preclusion
Rooker-Feldman
Valuation
Case Summary:
Plaintiffs Gary and Barbara Cerny moved the Court to reconsider its motion granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss the case. The Court initially dismissed the case because the essence of the complaint was seeking a review of a state court foreclosure judgment, which barred this Court’s jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Further, the complaint otherwise failed to state a claim, and Defendant Judge Jeffrey Kuglitsch was immune from liability in his professional and personal capacities. In their motion to reconsider, the Plaintiffs failed to present any newly discovered evidence or allege any error in this Court’s decision. The Plaintiffs’ motion was simply a rehash of their complaint, and no extraordinary circumstances warranted reconsideration. This Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion.
Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. 9024 -- Relief from Judgment or Order
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) -- Relief from a Judgment or Order
Key Terms:
Full Faith and Credit
Judicial Immunity
Jurisdiction
Reconsideration
Rooker-Feldman
Case Summary:
Debtors filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and creditor John Deere Financial Services moved for relief from the automatic stay to enforce its contractual rights regarding a tractor and lawn mower deck. Deere submitted evidence that it had security interests in the collateral and that Debtors had failed to make postpetition payments. Debtors’ scheduled value of the collateral showed that there was no equity in the equipment. Debtors, however, maintained that they were sovereign citizens, that they were the secured creditors, that all their bills are paid by a trust the government holds under Mrs. Sloniker’s Social Security number, and that unspecified fraud had been committed. The Court refused to entertain Debtors’ arguments based on their sovereign-citizenship theory. The Court granted Deere’s motion and ordered the Chapter 7 trustee to abandon the collateral. Also, the Court noted that stay relief may not be necessary in the first place under section 362(c)(3). But the Court acknowledged that seeking stay relief was best practice.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)
11 U.S.C. § 554 -- Abandonment of property of the estate
Key Terms:
Abandonment
Automatic Stay
Equity
Sovereign Citizen
Case Summary:
Debtors filed prior case in June 2024. They both received a discharge. But after their discharge, the Chapter 7 trustee moved to compel production of certain documents. The Court held a hearing on the motion to compel in November, at which Mrs. Sloniker stated that she wouldn’t produce certain trust documents, even if ordered to do so by the Court. The Court ordered the Debtors to produce the documents, which they ultimately failed to do. The U.S. Trustee filed an adversary proceeding seeking revocation of Mrs. Sloniker’s discharge for failing to comply with the Court’s order. The Court ruled in favor of the U.S. Trustee and revoked Mrs. Sloniker’s discharge. Mr. Justo’s discharge remained intact. Later, the Chapter 7 trustee moved to dismiss the prior case for failure to comply with the Court-ordered motion to compel. The Court granted the motion and dismissed that case in March 2025. The Debtors then filed this case a week later. The U.S. Trustee moved to dismiss, arguing that the Debtors were ineligible to be debtors under section 109(g) for having a prior case dismissed within the past 180 days for failure to comply with a Court order. The Court held a hearing on the motion at which counsel for the U.S. Trustee and the Debtors each appeared in person. The Court granted the U.S. Trustee’s motion and dismissed the case as to Mrs. Sloniker under section 109(g). The case wasn’t dismissed as to Mr. Justo, but the Court noted that he was ineligible for a discharge under section 727(a)(8) and provided him time to decide whether he wants to remain in the case.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 109(g) -- Who may be a debtor
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) -- Nondischargeability – previous discharge
Key Terms:
Discharge
Eligibility
Case Summary:
Debtors George and Ellen Conway claimed a $150,000 exemption in proceeds from the prepetition sale of their homestead. Chapter 7 Trustee Brian Hart objected to their exemption. Creditor Greenwich Business Capital had obtained a default judgment against George Conway and his entity and was seeking to attach the judgment to Debtors’ homestead. Trying to avoid liability and on advice of counsel, George Conway quit claimed his interest in the homestead to Ellen Conway. Greenwich filed a UCC financing statement with the Dane County Register of Deeds. Ellen tried to sell the property to a third party, but the UCC was identified as a potential cloud on title. The title agency required the Debtors to enter into a secured indemnity agreement which allowed the title company to keep the sale proceeds in trust until the UCC was extinguished or otherwise disposed of. Debtors filed their petition while the title company was in possession of the proceeds. The Court denied the homestead exemption for George but allowed Ellen to claim the exemption. George willfully relinquished his ownership to Ellen well in advance of the petition and thus was not an "owner" of the homestead and did not have a legal or equitable interest in the proceeds on the petition date. With respect to Ellen, even though the secured indemnity agreement gave legal ownership and possession of the proceeds to the title company, the intent of the agreement was not to permanently deprive Ellen of the proceeds, and she retained a contingent interest. Thus, she could claim the exemption.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 105 -- Power of court
11 U.S.C. § 522 -- Exemptions
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c) -- Burden of proof
Wis. Stat. § 706.01(4) -- Meaning of “conveyance”
Wis. Stat. § 766.63 -- Mixed property
Wis. Stat. § 815.20 -- Homestead exemption
Key Terms:
Exemptions
Homestead Exemption
Case Summary:
Debtors George and Ellen Conway sought to convert their Chapter 7 case to Chapter 13. They moved to convert more than eight months after they filed their case and after the Chapter 7 trustee had initiated three adversary proceedings to recover assets for their estate. The Debtors' motion was filed in conjunction with a proposed settlement agreement with a creditor, Greenwich Business Capital, which had sued Debtors for alleged fraud and objected to their claimed exemption. This Court determined that Greenwich wasn't properly secured and denied the settlement. Debtors continued to seek conversion, but the Court denied their motion. Administration of the Debtors' case was already well underway, and the Debtors' apparent motives seeking conversion were not to benefit creditors, but rather to attempt to shield assets from administration by the Chapter 7 trustee. Debtors had not demonstrated good faith, and Debtors' proposed Chapter 13 plan was not in the best interest of creditors.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 704 -- Duties of trustee
11 U.S.C. § 706 -- Conversion
11 U.S.C. § 1307 -- Conversion or dismissal
11 U.S.C. § 1325 -- Confirmation of plan
Key Terms:
Conversion
Good Faith
Time Value of Money
Case Summary:
Debtors Gary and Barbara Cerny filed a pro se action against their mortgage lender, Old National Bank; Old National's state court lawyers, Eckberg Lammers, P.C.; and State Court Judge Jeffrey S. Kuglitsch over a July 2023 foreclosure judgment. Plaintiffs argued that Old National wasn't the proper holder of their mortgage, and thus the foreclosure judgment should be declared null and void. They also alleged violations of the Uniform Commercial Code and the United States Constitution. Each Defendant moved to dismiss the case based on various theories, which the Court granted. First, this Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, along with principles of full faith and credit, and claim and issue preclusion. Next, although the complaint alleged fraud, it failed to state allegations of fraud with particularity and thus couldn't withstand Defendants' motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Plaintiffs' claims that Old National wasn't the proper holder of the note under the U.C.C. were also without merit. Finally, even if this Court had jurisdiction to hear the complaint, Judge Kuglitsch would be immune from liability in both his professional and personal capacities.
Key Terms:
Full Faith and Credit
Judicial Immunity
Jurisdiction
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Statute/Rule References:
28 U.S.C. § 157 -- Jurisdiction
28 U.S.C. § 1334 -- Bankruptcy cases and proceedings
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) -- Failure to state a claim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) -- Fraud or mistake