Case Summary:
Plaintiffs objected to the bill of costs filed by the prevailing defendant, specifically to expert witness fees in the amount of $ 3,250 for the medical examiner. Under Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), outside of court-appointed expert witnesses, an award of expert witness fees is limited to the amount in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 unless the parties have contracted otherwise or there is explicit statutory authority to the contrary. The Plaintiffs argued that the expert witness fees for the medical examiner should be limited to the amounts set forth in § 1821. The Defendant argued that the fees were authorized by Wisconsin Statutes §§ 59.36 and 59.38. The Bankruptcy Court held that rate setting is not the type of statutory authorization to which Crawford was referring. While these provisions authorized the medical examiner’s fees in the sense that they authorized how much he may charge for his services as a medical examiner, the Supreme Court in Crawford meant that there must be statutory authorization for the fees to be taxed as costs. Therefore, the Defendant’s award of costs was limited to the amounts set forth in § 1821.

Statute/Rule References:
28 U.S.C. § 1821
28 U.S.C. § 1920
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054
Wis. Stat. § 59.38
Wis. Stat. § 59.36

Key Terms:
Expert Witness Fees
Fee Dispute

Case Summary:
Teenage girl died in a rollover accident. The driver had been drinking, underage, at a party hosted by the debtor. Plaintiffs (the victim’s parents and her estate) brought claims of battery and sexual assault at the party, and wrongful death for the rollover accident. The Plaintiffs sought to have these debts determined non-dischargeable as “willful and malicious injury.” The Bankruptcy Court held that the Plaintiffs failed to prove that any battery and sexual assault occurred, given that the Plaintiffs’ main witness was not credible and remaining evidence was negligible. The Bankruptcy Court also held that any social host liability the Debtor may have had for the accident did not rise to the level of willful and malicious injury in this case. Under the standard of Jendusa-Nicolai v. Larsen, 677 F.3d 320, 322 (7th Cir. 2012), the Plaintiffs failed to prove that the Debtor desired to inflict the victim’s injuries or that he knew they were highly likely to result.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - Willful and Malicious Injury

Key Terms:
Dischargeability - Willful and Malicious

Case Summary:
During the Debtors’ marriage, the Debtor-wife received an interest in real property from her father. The Debtors later executed a mortgage note with a bank and pledged the real property as collateral. The Debtors made payments on the mortgage note with marital property funds. The Debtors filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, and each claimed an exemption in the real property under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). The Chapter 7 Trustee objected, claiming that the wife’s interest in the real property was individual property under Wisconsin law, and therefore, the husband could not claim any exemption in it. The Bankruptcy Court found that marital property was “mixed” with the wife’s individual property under Wis. Stat. § 766.63(1) because the principal payments the Debtors made on the mortgage note constituted marital property. However, because the marital property component could be traced, the real property was not reclassified to marital property. The Debtor-husband was entitled to claim an exemption in his undivided one-half interest in the amount of principal payments made on the mortgage note.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 522(d) -- Exemptions - Federal
Wis. Stat. § 766.63(1)

Key Terms:
Marital Property
Mixed Property
Mortgage Payments
Wild Card Exemption