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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay

Gary O. Cerny and Barbara M. Cerny v. Old National Bank, Judge Jeffrey S. Kuglitsch, and Eckberg Lammers, P.C. (In re Cerny), Adv. No. 24-00061, Case No. 24-10322-13 (01/28/2026) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 01/28/2026

Case Summary:

Plaintiffs Gary and Barbara Cerny moved for relief from a judgment. Plaintiffs asked the Court to vacate its decision and reopen an adversary proceeding against Old National Bank, Judge Jeffrey S. Kuglitsch, and the law firm Eckberg Lammers, P.C. The Court initially dismissed Plaintiffs’ adversary proceeding because their complaint sought review of a state court foreclosure judgment. The Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Plaintiffs sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then appealed. The District Court affirmed the dismissal. In their motion for relief from judgment, Plaintiffs did not provide new grounds for relief and repeated prior arguments. The Court found there was no basis under Rule 60 to reconsider and vacate its decision and prior order dismissing the adversary proceeding. The Court reiterated it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and was bound to give preclusive effect to the state court judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Act. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion.

Statute/Rule References:

Fed. R. Bankr. 9024 -- Relief from Judgment or Order
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) -- Relief from a Judgment or Order

Key Terms:

Full Faith and Credit
Judicial Immunity
Jurisdiction
Reconsideration
Rooker-Feldman

In re: Sukowatey, Case No. 25-11435-13 (11/26/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 11/26/2025

Case Summary:
Creditor Town of Warren (the "Town") filed a motion for determination of the inapplicability of the automatic stay or, in the alternative, for relief fro the automatic stay. The basis for the Town's motion was en enforcement of raze orders against two parcels of adjacent real estate owned by the Debtors. The Town argued that enforcement of the raze orders fell within the police and regulatory power exception under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). The Debtors conceded that razing one property, a residential property, as appropriate. So, the Court's analysis focused on whether section 362(b)(4) authorized the Town to proceed with razing the other property, a commercial property. The Court held that the Town has failed, so far, to prove the raze order with respect to the commercial property is a valid exercise of the Town's police and regulatory power under § 362(b)(4). The Court found that the Town failed to show that its actions effectuate public policy rather than adjudicate private rights. Further, the Court noted that the record suggested the Town sought to protect a pecuniary governmental interest in commercial property rather than to protect the public health and safety. As for the Town's alternative request for relief from the automatic stay, the Court concluded that there are material facts in dispute. Accordingly, the Court ruled that further evidentiary proceedings are required to determine whether to grant relief from stay. 

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) -- Automatic Stay
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) -- Police and Regulatory Power Exception to the Automatic Stay
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) -- Relief from the Automatic Stay
Wis. Stat. § 66.0413(1) -- Razing Buildings

Key Terms:
Automatic Stay
Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay
Police and Regulatory Power Exception
Raze Order

In re McNall, Case No. 25-10375-7 (10/22/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 10/22/2025

Case Summary:
Creditor North American Banking Company (“NABC”) moved to extend the deadline to object to the Debtors’ discharge in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. NABC based its request on certain collateral for which it had received relief from the automatic stay to repossess on May 22, 2025. However, Batavia Leasing Company (“Batavia”), another creditor, had obtained relief from the stay to repossess the same collateral on May 21. The deadline to object to the discharge expired on May 23. NABC filed a secured proof of claim on June 23. NABC claimed that on June 25, it discovered Batavia asserted an ownership interest in the collateral which the Debtors had already surrendered to Batavia. NABC did not file its motion to extend the objection deadline to the discharge until July 29. The Debtors objected to NABC’s motion. Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(a), 4004(b)(2), and 4007(c), the Court held that NABC was not entitled to an extension. The Court found that NABC was aware of the need to seek an extension and that nothing prevented NABC from filing a motion for an extension before the May 23 deadline. The Court also noted NABC did not file its motion for relief from stay until two-and-a-half months after the February petition date. Rejecting NABC’s argument that it was entitled to equitable tolling, the Court concluded that NABC failed to show it diligently pursued its rights or that some extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. Hence, the Court denied NABC’s motion to extend time to object to the discharge.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R.  Bankr. P. 4004(a) — Time for Objection to Discharge
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(b)(2) — Extension of Time
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c) — Time for Filing Complaint under § 523(c)

Key Terms:
Extension
Filing Complaint
Objection to Discharge

In re Harvey, Case No. 18-13398-7 (08/28/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 08/28/2025

Case Summary:
In 2018, the Court entered an order denying Debtor’s discharge in connection with an adversary proceeding brought by the United States Trustee. Debtor’s case was closed in 2020. Five years later, Debtor sought to reopen his case to stay a scheduled sheriff’s sale of his home, and moved to do so on an expedited basis. Debtor alleged that recently revealed perjury and malfeasance of a business associate exonerated the Debtor and entitled him to relief from the order denying his discharge. The Court denied his motion. The alleged perjury of Debtor’s business associate was covered at trial and addressed in the Court’s decision denying Debtor’s discharge. No new facts or evidence were sufficiently introduced to warrant reopening Debtor’s case, let alone vacating the decision denying his discharge. Further, Debtor’s stated reason for reopening his case was simply for the benefit of the automatic stay to halt the scheduled sheriff’s sale of his home.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 350(b) -- Reopening
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c) -- Reduction of time
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 -- Relief from a Judgment or Order
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 – Relief from a Judgment or Order

Key Terms:
Motion to Reopen
Motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order
Motion to Expedite
Denial of Discharge

Mark Wittman v. Zack Fick, Lindsey Fick, and Ivy Christensen (In re Fick), Adv. No. 25-00015, Case No. 23-11601-7 (08/27/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 08/27/2025

Case Summary:
Chapter 7 Trustee sued alleged recipients of prepetition inheritance and other funds. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement. The Court denied Defendants’ motion. The Chapter 7 Trustee adequately pled the material facts of the disputed transactions sufficient to put Defendants on notice of the disputed act. The Trustee’s complaint included the amount of the funds, to whom they were transferred, and when, along with a legally sufficient claim for relief to avoid the transfers.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) -- Failure to state a claim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) -- Motion for a more definite statement

Key Terms:
Avoidance
Motion for a More Definite Statement
Motion to Dismiss

In re Mossuto, Case No. 24-11826-13 (07/01/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 07/01/2025

Case Summary:
Debtors William and Lisa Mossuto sought to estimate the claim of creditor CRS Properties, LLC. CRS obtained a prepetition foreclosure judgment in state court. Debtors appealed the judgment and filed their Chapter 13 petition before the redemption period expired. In their bankruptcy case, Debtors objected to CRS’s claim and requested this Court estimate the claim for the purposes of plan confirmation and a pending motion for relief from the automatic stay. In response, CRS pointed to the state court judgment and requested this Court to adopt the value of the judgment as the correct and allowed amount of its claim. This Court agreed with CRS. The first issue was whether Rooker-Feldman barred this Court from reviewing the judgment, which this Court found it didn’t since the judgment had been appealed. But secondly, the doctrine of claim preclusion obliged this Court to give preclusive effect to the foreclosure judgment since there was an identity of the parties, an identity of the claims, and the judgment constituted a final judgment on the merits. Further, although Debtors argued that the value of their property was lower than the filed secured claim of CRS, they offered no evidence in support of their alleged valuation. Thus, the Court allowed CRS’s secured claim in the amount filed.

Statute References:
11 U.S.C. § 502 -- Allowance of claims or interests
28 U.S.C. § 1738 -- State and Territorial statutes and judicial proceedings; full faith and credit

Key Terms:
Claim Estimation
Claim Preclusion
Rooker-Feldman
Valuation

Gary O. Cerny and Barbara M. Cerny v. Old National Bank, Judge Jeffrey S. Kuglitsch, and Eckberg Lammers, P.C. (In re Cerny), Adv. No. 24-00061, Case No. 24-10322-13 (06/26/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 06/26/2025

Case Summary:
Plaintiffs Gary and Barbara Cerny moved the Court to reconsider its motion granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss the case. The Court initially dismissed the case because the essence of the complaint was seeking a review of a state court foreclosure judgment, which barred this Court’s jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Further, the complaint otherwise failed to state a claim, and Defendant Judge Jeffrey Kuglitsch was immune from liability in his professional and personal capacities. In their motion to reconsider, the Plaintiffs failed to present any newly discovered evidence or allege any error in this Court’s decision. The Plaintiffs’ motion was simply a rehash of their complaint, and no extraordinary circumstances warranted reconsideration. This Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. 9024 -- Relief from Judgment or Order
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) -- Relief from a Judgment or Order

Key Terms:
Full Faith and Credit
Judicial Immunity
Jurisdiction
Reconsideration
Rooker-Feldman

 
In re Sloniker, Case 25-10673-7 (05/21/2025) 670 B.R. 349 -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 05/21/2025

Case Summary:
Debtors filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and creditor John Deere Financial Services moved for relief from the automatic stay to enforce its contractual rights regarding a tractor and lawn mower deck. Deere submitted evidence that it had security interests in the collateral and that Debtors had failed to make postpetition payments. Debtors’ scheduled value of the collateral showed that there was no equity in the equipment. Debtors, however, maintained that they were sovereign citizens, that they were the secured creditors, that all their bills are paid by a trust the government holds under Mrs. Sloniker’s Social Security number, and that unspecified fraud had been committed. The Court refused to entertain Debtors’ arguments based on their sovereign-citizenship theory. The Court granted Deere’s motion and ordered the Chapter 7 trustee to abandon the collateral. Also, the Court noted that stay relief may not be necessary in the first place under section 362(c)(3). But the Court acknowledged that seeking stay relief was best practice.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)
11 U.S.C. § 554 -- Abandonment of property of the estate

Key Terms:
Abandonment
Automatic Stay
Equity
Sovereign Citizen

In re Sloniker, Case No. 25-10673-7 (5/21/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 05/21/2025

Case Summary:
Debtors filed prior case in June 2024. They both received a discharge. But after their discharge, the Chapter 7 trustee moved to compel production of certain documents. The Court held a hearing on the motion to compel in November, at which Mrs. Sloniker stated that she wouldn’t produce certain trust documents, even if ordered to do so by the Court. The Court ordered the Debtors to produce the documents, which they ultimately failed to do. The U.S. Trustee filed an adversary proceeding seeking revocation of Mrs. Sloniker’s discharge for failing to comply with the Court’s order. The Court ruled in favor of the U.S. Trustee and revoked Mrs. Sloniker’s discharge. Mr. Justo’s discharge remained intact. Later, the Chapter 7 trustee moved to dismiss the prior case for failure to comply with the Court-ordered motion to compel. The Court granted the motion and dismissed that case in March 2025. The Debtors then filed this case a week later. The U.S. Trustee moved to dismiss, arguing that the Debtors were ineligible to be debtors under section 109(g) for having a prior case dismissed within the past 180 days for failure to comply with a Court order. The Court held a hearing on the motion at which counsel for the U.S. Trustee and the Debtors each appeared in person. The Court granted the U.S. Trustee’s motion and dismissed the case as to Mrs. Sloniker under section 109(g). The case wasn’t dismissed as to Mr. Justo, but the Court noted that he was ineligible for a discharge under section 727(a)(8) and provided him time to decide whether he wants to remain in the case.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 109(g) -- Who may be a debtor
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) -- Nondischargeability – previous discharge

Key Terms:
Discharge
Eligibility

In re Conway, Case No. 24-10126-7 (05/09/2025) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 05/09/2025

Case Summary:
Debtors George and Ellen Conway sought to convert their Chapter 7 case to Chapter 13. They moved to convert more than eight months after they filed their case and after the Chapter 7 trustee had initiated three adversary proceedings to recover assets for their estate. The Debtors' motion was filed in conjunction with a proposed settlement agreement with a creditor, Greenwich Business Capital, which had sued Debtors for alleged fraud and objected to their claimed exemption. This Court determined that Greenwich wasn't properly secured and denied the settlement. Debtors continued to seek conversion, but the Court denied their motion. Administration of the Debtors' case was already well underway, and the Debtors' apparent motives seeking conversion were not to benefit creditors, but rather to attempt to shield assets from administration by the Chapter 7 trustee. Debtors had not demonstrated good faith, and Debtors' proposed Chapter 13 plan was not in the best interest of creditors.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 704 -- Duties of trustee
11 U.S.C. § 706 -- Conversion
11 U.S.C. § 1307 -- Conversion or dismissal
11 U.S.C. § 1325 -- Confirmation of plan

Key Terms:
Conversion
Good Faith
Time Value of Money

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