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Opinions
The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.
Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.
For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.
Available Decisions:
- Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay -- 2013 - present
- Judge William V. Altenberger -- 2016 - present
- Judge Rachel M. Blise -- 2021 - present
- Judge William H. Frawley -- 1973 - 1986
- Judge G. Michael Halfenger -- 2020 - present
- Judge Beth E. Hanan -- 2023 - present
- Judge Brett H. Ludwig -- 2017 - 2020
- Judge Thomas M. Lynch -- 2018 - present
- Judge Robert D. Martin -- 1990 - 2016
- Judge Katherine M. Perhach -- 2020 - present
- Judge Thomas S. Utschig -- 1986 - 2012
Judge Robert D. Martin
Case Summary:
In 1996 Debtor physically attacked Plaintiff. Debtor was charged with aggravated battery with intent to cause substantial bodily harm and pled guilty. In 1998 Plaintiff commenced an intentional tort action against Debtor. Prior to judgment being rendered debtor filed her Chapter 7 petition staying the tort action. Plaintiff filed this adversary proceeding seeking summary judgment arguing that as a result of the guilty plea in the criminal action, debtor was collaterally estopped from contesting the willful and malicious nature of the injury that gave rise to the debt. The Court denied the summary judgment motion. The parties agreed to lifting the stay to permit the state tort action to proceed to judgment, which was subsequently entered. Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment for a second time contending that the tort judgment supports collateral estoppel and bars debtor from contesting the willful and malicious nature of her debt for purposes of § 523(a)(6). This Court determined that she was correct and granted her motion for summary judgment.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - Willful and Malicious Injury
28 U.S.C. § 1738 -- State and Territorial Statutes and Judicial Proceedings: Full Faith and Credit
Wis. Stat. § 940.19(5)
Key Terms:
Collateral Estoppel
Discharge
Summary Judgment
Case Summary:
Debtors challenged claim of First American Credit Union (“FACU”). At issue is whether a car pledged as security for a direct loan also secured a credit card debt by virtue of a dragnet clause in the loan contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment based on stipulated facts. Debtors made three arguments: that FACU never explained the meaning of the dragnet clause in the contract; that they did not read the dragnet clauses and had no intention of pledging the car as security for the credit card debt, and that the dragnet clauses in the Rules and car loan contract "were in boilerplate fine print." FACU countered that the dragnet clauses were customary and ordinary provisions and that debtors’ intent to pledge the car as security interest for the credit card debt is evident from the fact that debtors received the Rules and signed the car loan contract, both of which included dragnet clauses. FACU further argued that it had no obligation to explain the meaning or effect of the dragnet clauses to debtors. It was determined that the intent of debtors to grant FACU a security interest in the car for other debts is evident from the clear language of the dragnet clauses in the Rules and the car loan contract.
Key Terms:
Security Interests - Creation
Summary Judgment
Case Summary:
This adversary proceeding was brought by the trustee against Farmers Bank to determine the validity of Farmers Bank’s security interest in proceeds from crop support contracts between Debtors and the USDA. The parties reached a stipulated resolution. In exchange, Farmers Bank released its claim on proceeds that had been paid to the Estate and the Trustee agreed to assist Farmers Bank in securing unpaid proceeds that the USDA had refused to pay. The USDA was then joined. The USDA argued that the PFC contracts were rejected and deemed that rejection a breach of the PFC contracts, which entitled the USDA to treat the contracts as void. The Trustee and Farmers Bank argued that the PFC contracts were abandoned in the Chapter 11 case, leaving nothing to be rejected either before or after the case was converted. The PFC contracts were abandoned by a proper order in the Chapter 11 case. That abandonment removed the contracts from the chapter 11 estate and ended the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction over them. The abandoned status of the contracts was not altered by the conversion of the case to Chapter 7. The effect of abandonment was to return all parties to the PFC contracts to their legal positions prior to the bankruptcy filing.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 348 -- Conversion
11 U.S.C. § 365 -- Executory Contracts
11 U.S.C. § 541 -- Property of the Estate
Key Terms:
Abandonment
Executory Contracts
Case Summary:
Shortly before Debtor filed for bankruptcy he filed his federal income tax return for the previous year and was entitled to a refund. Approximately one month after the tax return was filed, the IRS applied the refund to Debtor's 1993 federal income tax deficiency. The IRS filed a proof of claim for unsecured priority (for 1995 and 1996) and non-priority (for 1993 and 1994) taxes due. Debtor then brought this adversary proceeding seeking to reallocate the funds set off by the IRS and objecting to its claim of priority for the 1995 taxes. The parties agreed that the IRS had a valid right to setoff under § 553(a). Debtor contends that it is inequitable to permit the IRS to setoff against non-priority debts, rather than priority debts, because this gives the IRS a preference over other general creditors. However, a setoff under § 553 is a preference condoned under the Code and an exception to the bankruptcy principle of equal distribution among creditors. It was determined that the IRS had properly exercised its ability to off set in this case. It was further determined that because the due date for the debtor's 1995 tax return fell outside the three-year period preceding his bankruptcy case, the 1995 taxes would ordinarily not be entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8). There was an added wrinkle in the case, however, since the Debtor had previously filed bankruptcy in 1996 and was discharged in 1997. The IRS argued that the three-year period of § 507(a)(8) was tolled during the period of the prior bankruptcy case and for an additional six months thereafter. It was determined that § 6503(h) is given effect by § 108(c) and that the two provisions operate jointly to toll the three-year period in § 507(a)(8) when the taxpayer's assets are tied up in a court proceeding. It was further determined that the 1995 taxes are entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8).
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 108(c)
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) -- Nondischargeability - Taxes
11 U.S.C. § 553 -- Setoff
26 U.S.C. § 6402(a) -- General Rule
26 U.S.C. § 6503(h) -- Cases Under Title 11 of the United States Code
Key Terms:
Taxes
Setoff
Case Summary:
Bank moved for stay relief under § 362(d)(1) claiming a lack of adequate protection of its interest in the stock it held under a pledge by Debtor as collateral for a letter of credit, which it sought to liquidate. Bank argued lack of adequate protection principally because the stock may depreciate in value. Bank held a contingent secured claim as the DNR may demand an undetermined amount under the letter of credit. Once the DNR draw is made, Bank has the right to reimbursement from the proceeds of stocks pledged by debtor. Bank also sought relief under § 362(d)(2) and bears the initial burden of proving debtor has no equity in the stock. The presence of equity depends on the draw by the DNR under the letter of credit. It was found that because there is no part of the stock's value that is free from the contingent claim of Bank as of the date of the petition, debtor had no equity for purposes of § 362(d)(2)(A). It was also found that the maintenance of the stock was a benefit of the creditors as the cost of disposition to Debtor would include a potentially substantial tax liability that would have to be paid as post-petition indebtedness which would certainly jeopardize Debtor's ability to make payments on pre-petition debts. Although there may be a certain inevitability to that expense, to permit Bank to accelerate the crisis by selling the stock before it lacks adequate protection and before the DNR draws on the letter of credit would undermine the feasibility of the plan. Bank's relief from stay was denied.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 361 -- Adequate Protection
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) -- Relief from stay
11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(1)
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) -- Determination of secured status
11 U.S.C. § 506(d) -- Lien valuation and strip down
11 U.S.C. § 1121(b)
11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2)
11 U.S.C. § 1322 -- Mortgage protection
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) -- Modification of rights of secured claimants
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)
Key Terms:
Adequate Protection
Letters of Credit
Relief from Stay
"Strip Down"
Case Summary:
Debtor stipulated to judgment of divorce assigning certain marital debts to each party, including a waiver of maintenance by Debtor in exchange for Section 71 payments from ex-spouse. The stipulation also set forth that the Section 71 payments could not be modified unless one party dies or the Debtor received an award for child support. When Debtor failed to pay her debts from the divorce judgement, ex-spouse filed contempt proceedings in state court. Ex-spouse was awarded judgment of the unpaid debts from the divorce judgment, among other awards. Debtor then sought Chapter 7 relief and subsequently received her discharge. Almost a year later the ex-spouse petitioned the state court to revise the divorce judgment requesting a reduction of the Section 71 payments to reflect Debtor's non-payment of bills which were imposed upon him as a result of Debtor's bankruptcy. Debtor filed a motion to reopen her case in order to bring a contempt motion and leave was granted. It was found that the ex-spouse was estopped from moving to modify the Section 71 payments. It was also found that the ex-spouse was attempting to enforce a discharged debt and was sanctioned under § 524 for Debtor's actual costs incurred in enforcing the discharge injunction of her bankruptcy.
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 341(a)
11 U.S.C. § 362(h) -- Damages for Willful Stay Violations
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) -- Nondischargeability - Marital Obligations
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) -- Nondischargeability - Divorce Decrees
11 U.S.C. § 523(c)
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)
11 U.S.C. § 727 -- Discharge
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(b) -- Time for Commencing Proceeding Other than Under § 523
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c) -- Time for Filing Nondischargeability Complaint
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(3)
Key Terms:
Sanctions
Divorce Decrees - Maintenance or Property Division
Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 522(d) -- Exemptions - Federal
15 U.S.C § 1673 -- Restriction on Garnishment
Key Terms:
Exemptions
Judge Thomas S. Utschig
Case Summary:
Debtor brought adversary proceeding to determine whether his student loans should be discharged as an “undue hardship” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). The court concluded that the debtor’s financial condition was such that he would not be able to maintain a minimal standard of living if required to repay the loans. Further, this condition was likely to persist for the foreseeable future, and the debtor had acted in good faith. There is also no basis for restructuring or deferring the debt. Reversed on appeal.
Statue/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) -- Nondischargeability - Student Loans
Key Terms:
Student Loans
Case Summary:
On remand of district court’s order reversing prior order granting discharge of student loan debts, the bankruptcy court again considered the debtor’s financial condition. Debtor did not have significant income, and had in fact been unemployed for a period of time. The court concluded that the debtor had demonstrated an “undue hardship” within the meaning of U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). The court also rejected the suggestion that the court could further defer or reduce the debtor’s loan obligations.
Statue/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) -- Nondischargeability - Student Loans
Key Terms:
Student Loans