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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Available Decisions:

  • Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay -- 2013 - present
  • Judge William V. Altenberger -- 2016 - present
  • Judge Rachel M. Blise -- 2021 - present
  • Judge William H. Frawley -- 1973 - 1986
  • Judge G. Michael Halfenger -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Beth E. Hanan -- 2023 - present
  • Judge Brett H. Ludwig -- 2017 - 2020
  • Judge Thomas M. Lynch -- 2018 - present
  • Judge Robert D. Martin -- 1990 - 2016
  • Judge Katherine M. Perhach -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Thomas S. Utschig -- 1986 - 2012

Judge Robert D. Martin

In re J.P. Hering Distributing Company, Inc., Case No. 02-16113-11 and In re Quality Beverages of Wisconsin, Inc., Case No. 02-16114-11 (03/27/2003) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 03/27/2003

Case Summary:
At the close of trial in this proceeding it was determined that the 1997 contract between the Plaintiff, Western Wisconsin Water, Inc. d/b/a La Crosse Premium Water (“Western”), and the Defendant, Quality Beverages of Wisconsin, Inc. (“Quality”), gave Western a “first right of refusal” to acquire (1) all of the 469 accounts sold to Quality; and (2) all growth attributable to those accounts. Quality’s failure to offer to sell Western the accounts constituted a breach of the contract. Western was entitled to compensation for losses necessarily flowing from that breach. Those losses included anticipated profits from the resale of the accounts and from exclusive distributorship agreements into which Western would have entered. Western was also entitled to recover expenses incurred in mitigating its losses and damages as well as judgment for the account payable from Quality.

The contract provided Western a sort of option to purchase 552 accounts from Quality when Quality sold those accounts and others to Crystal Canyons in 2001. That number includes the accounts sold under the 1997 contract (469) and the proportionate increase in Quality’s accounts attributable to those original accounts (83). After the breach, Western mitigated its damages by acquiring 400 of the 552 accounts subject to its option. As to those 400 accounts, Western was entitled to be reimbursed its costs of mitigation.

It was determined that on the remaining 152 accounts that Western did not acquire, it was entitled to recover its lost profits. Based upon the calculations outlined in the memorandum decision, Plaintiff was granted judgment against the Defendants.

Key Terms:
Breach of Contract
Exclusive Distributorship Agreement
Mitigate Damages
First Right of Refusal
Lost Profits

In re Kane, Case No. 02-11588-13 (03/27/2003) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 03/27/2003

Case Summary:
The Debtor’s son-in-law, Ronald Vogt, had been managing VATW, a satellite operation of Monroe Ag-Tech (“Monroe”). Monroe advanced operating funds on a monthly basis to VATW, including an amount designated as Mr. Vogt’s salary. Badger State Bank (“Badger”) permitted VATW to pay Mr. Vogt from accounts in which Badger had a security interest. In early 2001, VATW began having financial difficulties. Monroe stopped advancing operating funds and Mr. Vogt stopped receiving his salary. By August 2001, VATW was insolvent and owed Mr. Vogt a substantial amount of unpaid salary. VATW closed its doors to the public and surrendered its assets to Badger. However, the assets were insufficient to satisfy VATW’s debt.

At the time VATW was closing, Mr. Vogt issued three checks in the amount of $29,000 drawn on VATW’s account to the Debtor to repay money lent to him. The parties agreed that the amount owed to Mr. Vogt was more than $29,000.

In January 2002, Badger sued the Debtor in Circuit Court seeking to recover the transfers as fraudulent under state law. The Debtor was unable to bear the costs associated with defending herself and filed for Chapter 13 protection. Her schedules did not include assets under her husband’s exclusive control.

Badger presented an elaborate objection to confirmation of Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan. Badger claimed to be a creditor of the Debtor by virtue of her having received a fraudulent transfer of property from a company at a time when that company was indebted to Badger. Badger had no other claims against Debtor. If Badger were entitled to recover the transferred property from the Debtor, complicated issues would arise as to whether the Debtor’s plan was in the creditors’ best interest.

The Debtor denied that a fraudulent transfer occurred and that Badger had a claim against her estate. She argued that neither she nor her creditors had any rights to property under her husband’s exclusive control pursuant to a marital property agreement that she and her husband signed in 1995. Badger claimed that the marital property agreement was too vague to be enforced.

It was determined that Badger’s standing to object to the plan depended upon the Debtor’s receipt of a fraudulent transfer. Badger’s transfer was not fraudulent and the Debtor was not obligated to Badger and Badger did not have standing to object to her plan. Thus, Badger’s objection based on the marital property agreement was not explored.

Statute/Rule References:
Wis. Stat. § 242 -- Fraudulent Conveyance

Key Terms:
Fraudulent Transfer

In re Chapman, Case No. 01-34985-13 (03/19/2003) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 03/19/2003

Case Summary:
The Debtors filed their Chapter 7 petition on August 8, 2001. An attorney for the trustee was appointed. The Debtors valued certain owned real estate. The Trustee’s attorney investigated that value and found that the county tax assessor valued the property substantially higher and informed the Debtors. The Debtors then moved to convert their case to Chapter 13 and their motion was granted. The Trustee’s attorney objected to confirmation of the plan because it failed to meet the best interest of creditors’ test. The Debtors amended their plan before the final confirmation hearing was held. Meanwhile attorneys fees were incurred on behalf of the Trustee preparing for the hearings, hiring an appraiser, and examining the Debtors at their § 341 meeting.

In December 2002 the Trustee’s attorney moved for an allowance of an administrative claim for services rendered in connection with the bankruptcy case and debtors objected. The Chapter 13 Trustee did not object.

At their motion hearing, Trustee’s attorney argued that it was entitled to administrative expense priority under U.S.C. § 503(b)(1). Trustee’s attorney filed a brief supporting their motion. Debtors did not file a brief.

It was determined that Trustee’s attorney objected to confirmation and incurred post-conversion costs and expenses, based upon its pre-conversion investigation of the value of debtors’ real estate. The post-conversion costs and expenses were intertwined with the pre-conversion services that Trustee’s attorney rendered and are reasonable in light of the benefit to creditors. Post-conversion costs and expenses should be treated as administrative expenses.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 327 -- Employment of Professionals
11 U.S.C. § 329 -- Debtor's Transactions with Attorneys
11 U.S.C. § 330 -- Compensation of Professionals
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A) and (B) -- Compensation of Officers
11 U.S.C. § 348 -- Conversion
11 U.S.C. § 503 -- Administrative Expenses
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) -- Priorities
11 U.S.C. § 507(b) -- Priorities
11 U.S.C. § 726 -- Distribution of Property of Estate
11 U.S.C. § 1306 -- Property of the Estate
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2)
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(a) -- Application for Compensation of Reimbursement
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(b) -- Disclosure of Compensation Paid or Promised to Attorney for Debtor
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 20:1:1 -- Competence
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 20:3:3 -- Candor Toward the Tribunal

Key Terms:
Attorney Fees - Award in Dischargeability Action
Personal Injury Proceeds
Post Conversion
Pre-Conversion
Sanctions

Robert E. Disch v. Faye F. Rasmussen (In re Rasmussen), Adv. No. 02-80, Case No. 02-10821-7 (02/11/2003) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 02/11/2003

Case Summary:
The Debtor-Defendant owned and operated a business known at Faval, Inc. In late 1999, Faval was struggling financially. The Plaintiff owned and operated a restaurant and two rental buildings and maintained steady employment. Plaintiff had known the Debtor-Defendant for over 40 years. In January 2000 Debtor-Defendant and Plaintiff met to discuss the Faval business, culminating in a payment made to Debtor-Defendant with a promise for more money in the future. In the period January 2000 through May 2001 Plaintiff gave Debtor-Defendant in excess of $810,000 through loans, lines of credit, checks and cash to use in Faval. The parties agreed that Debtor-Defendant would make payments when due on Plaintiff’s bank loans and begin to pay plaintiff for his personal loans once Faval became profitable.

During this time, and unknown to Plaintiff, Debtor-Defendant adopted a number of unusual bookkeeping methods that made tracking Faval’s finances virtually impossible. Debtor-defendant did not keep a general ledger and generally relied on her memory instead of books and records. Debtor-Defendant is unable to explain how loans were disbursed and even admitted to losing track of large loans made by other investors. Debtor-Defendant also frequently dealt with cash in an effort to avoid a Wisconsin Department of Revenue levy for unpaid income taxes.

In January 2001 plaintiff gave Debtor-Defendant his employer’s credit card number so she could purchase approximately $3,000 worth of materials from a supplier that would only accept a credit card. Debtor-Defendant continued to use the credit card to purchase other supplies, incurring over $6,800 in charges.

In the spring of 2001 Debtor-Defendant contacted one of the banks with whom Plaintiff took out a loan for Faval’s benefit and requested that the address be changed from Plaintiff’s home address to Debtor-Defendant’s business address in an effort to save Plaintiff the hassle of being notified when Debtor-Defendant was late in making payment. Debtor-Defendant did not inform plaintiff of the request, instead, the bank contacted him seeking his authorization.

The Plaintiff became concerned about Debtor-Defendant’s management of Faval and sought the assistance of his personal accountant to examine the Faval records. The accountant was unable to trace funds beyond their initial payment and sought bank records from Debtor-Defendant. Those records were not provided. A disturbing pattern of misappropriation and uncertainty as to the proper allocation of Faval funds was discovered. Debtor-Defendant did not provide sufficient information to explain the many discrepancies.

In August 2001 plaintiff’s attorney demanded that Debtor-Defendant repay his client $120,000 of the personal loans by the end of the month. Debtor-Defendant failed to do so. In October 2001 plaintiff then changed the locks on the building. In response, Debtor-Defendant ceased operations of Faval.

In February 2002 Debtor-Defendant filed for Chapter 7 protection. At her first meeting of creditors Debtor-Defendant asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege as to her personal and business financial statements, dates on which she incurred debts to certain creditors, and the use to which she put those funds.

Plaintiff filed an adversary complaint arguing that the court should draw a negative inference from Debtor-Defendant’s use of the Fifth Amendment privilege and that the debt to him was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), (4), and (6). He also argued that Debtor-Defendant’s behavior warranted the denial of her discharge. In total he sought recovery of $657,700 of funds loaned to Debtor-Defendant.

The Court granted Debtor’s discharge before hearing plaintiff’s adversary proceeding. In the vast majority of cases, parties plead adequately in adversary proceedings and the clerk of court’s staff can determine whether a claim has been filed under § 727. If none has, the clerk follows the standard procedure of granting a debtor’s discharge 60 days after their first meeting of creditors as to all debts that are not the subject of a pending adversary proceeding brought under § 523. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged grounds for relief under § 523, not § 727. Thus, on August 19, 2002, following its standard procedure and without evaluating the substance of plaintiff’s claims, the court issued debtor-defendant’s discharge as to all debts not subject to a pending adversary proceeding. At trial it was then determined that the pleadings should be constructively amended to include the § 727 objections and that debtor-defendant should not have received her discharge.

Debtor-Defendant’s discharge was revoked and denied pursuant to §§ 727(a)(2), (3), and (5). A money judgment in the amount of $657,700 was entered in favor of Plaintiff.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 105 -- Power of Court
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) -- Exceptions to Discharge
11 U.S.C. § 727 -- Discharge

Key Terms:
Fifth Amendment
Non-Dischargeable Debt
Revocation of Discharge

Party Concepts, Inc. v. American Greetings Corporation and Gibson Greetings, Inc. (In re Party Concepts, Inc.), Adv. No. 01-3286, Case No. 01-34625-11 (06/26/2002) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 06/26/2002

Case Summary:
Defendants filed a motion to compel the production of all documents pertaining to a stock purchase agreement and a supply agreement, the former of which was the focus of a breach of contract action against Defendant. These documents contained a memorandum from counsel marked "attorney-client communication." Defendants argued that Plaintiff had waived any attorney-client privilege by disclosing it to Defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) allows a court to limit discovery to the actual claims or defenses pled in a case. The Court also has discretion under Fed. R. Civ P. 26(b)(2)(iii) to limit discovery if it determines that "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit . . . ." This Court determined that even though the attorney-client privilege was waived, discovery is not compelled. Defendants' motion to compel is denied.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) -- Discovery Scope and Limits - In General
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) -- Discovery Scope and Limits - Limitations
Wis. Stat. § 905.11

Key Terms:
Attorney-Client Privilege
Breach of Contract
Non-Compete Covenant

In re Green, Case No. 01-34494-13 (03/28/2002) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 03/28/2002

Case Summary:
Estate moved for sanctions against Debtor's counsel for filing a Chapter 13 petition solely to harass the estate and cause it unnecessary delay. The Estate had received a judgment of foreclosure against certain real property of Debtor and a sheriff's sale had been scheduled. On the date of the sheriff's sale Debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition, staying the sheriff's sale. The Estate then obtained relief from stay. A second sheriff's sale was scheduled. Debtor's counsel filed a Chapter 13 petition without schedules or plan shortly before the sheriff's sale was to take place. Another automatic stay was obtained. The period in which the Debtor may file a payment plan ended without any plan being filed. Debtor's counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel citing Debtor's failure to confer with him on a payment plan and to pay his retainer fee. Counsel's motion was granted and the Chapter 13 case was dismissed. The Estate then filed a motion for sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011. The Estate claims that Debtor's counsel had no legal basis for filing the Chapter 13 petition before a discharge was entered in the prior Chapter 7 and that the Debtor's sole purpose in filing the Chapter 13 was to prevent the second sheriff's sale from proceeding. The Estate established that Debtor's counsel had violated Rule 9011. Sanctions was ordered for fees and expenses related to filing of the Chapter 13 petition.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 348 -- Conversion
11 U.S.C. §706
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 -- Sanctions
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 -- Sanctions

Key Terms:
Sanctions

In re Hommerding, Case No. 01-30061-13 (03/07/2002) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 03/07/2002

Case Summary:
Debtor returned to this Court asking that his second amended Chapter 13 plan be confirmed. Debtor initially came under this Court's jurisdiction as an involuntary Chapter 7 debtor and subsequently converted to a Chapter 13. Debtor filed a plan of reorganization and sought its confirmation. One of Debtor's petitioning creditors objected to the plan on the grounds that it did not satisfy 11 U.S.C. sec. 1325(a)(3)'s good faith requirement. Supporting its argument, the creditor pointed out that Debtor owes it a potentially non-dischargeable debt. It further argued that no sum would be paid to unsecured creditors under Debtor's plan and that the purpose of the Debtor's plan was to thwart his unsecured creditors. The Trustee also raised an issue as to the plan's feasibility noting that the original plan failed to satisfy a priority tax claim. Debtor had intended to use the proceeds from the sale of his gas station to pay that priority claim, but he did not have a full right to such proceeds at that time because his ex-wife also held a security interest in the property. This Court ruled that the plan could not be confirmed for its failure to meet the requirements of sec. 1322(a)(2) and sec. 507. This Court, however, granted Debtor leave to amend his plan to account for the priority tax claim. Debtor then obtained consent from his ex-wife to apply her share of the gas station's sale proceeds to the tax claim and filed an amended plan. The objecting creditor renewed its objection to confirmation and the trustee also objected to this amended plan because the Debtor proposed to make priority claim payments directly instead of through the trustee's office. The Debtor agreed to file a second amended plan responding to the Trustee's objection and the Trustee moved to dismiss the case. The case was then dismissed with a 14-day stay. The debtor filed the second amended plan within the 14-day stay period with an increase in payments and an extended plan length. The Trustee recommended confirmation of the second amended plan, but the creditor reasserted its prior objections. This Court determined that the plan could be confirmed over the objection of the creditor since it appears that debtor has made attempts to work out a repayment plan in accord with his current employment. The fact that Debtor had incurred a non-dischargeable debt to the objecting creditor would not mandate a finding of bad faith. Debtor's repayment plan appears to represent his best effort to repay his creditors and satisfies the good faith requirements for confirmation.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. §507(a)(1) -- Priorities
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - Willful and Malicious Injury
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2)
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)

Key Terms:
Confirmation - Chapter 13
Non-Dischargeable Debt

In re Gausewitz, Case No. 01-34926-13 (02/22/2002) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 02/22/2002

Case Summary:
Debtor sought to obtain credit to continue the operations of a ballroom. He eventually turned to Action Mortgage and its manager, Robert Call, for a loan. Following a strange transaction, debtor ended up the confused owner of a mortgage on a house he had never offered to purchase. Debtor also gave Action Mortgage a security interest in some construction equipment and vehicles which he owned. Debtor was unable to maintain payments on the mortgage and quitclaimed the house to Robert Call. Mr. Call took possession of the house and collected rents from the lessees who occupied it, but did not credit any amount to debtor's obligation to Action Mortgage. Debtor filed for chapter 13 relief and objected to the validity of Action Mortgage's claim against him alleging that the claim was obtained by fraud. Debtor further objected to the amount of Action Mortgage's claim arguing that the quitclaim terminated all or a significant portion of his debt. Mr. Call, on behalf of Action Mortgage, disagreed with debtor's contention and testified that the quitclaim did nothing to alter the original terms of the loan. Action Mortgage further alleged that its claim against debtor had risen to include accrued interest and filed a proof of claim in that amount. Action Mortgage also obtained a default judgment in state court for replevin of specified equipment against debtor and sought relief from the automatic stay to enforce its judgment. Debtor objected to Action Mortgage's claim and his testimony supported his allegations of fraud. He also called into question the amount owed to Action Mortgage in light of the quitclaim. The final burden of persuasion rested upon Action Mortgage to prove its claim. Action Mortgage did not present evidence sufficient to carry this burden. Debtor's objection to Action Mortgage's claim was sustained and Action Mortgage's motion for relief from stay was denied.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(1)
11 U.S.C. § 502 -- Allowance of Claims
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud
11 U.S.C. § 547 -- Preferences
Fed R. Evid. 1002 -- Requirement of Original
Fed R. Evid. 1003 -- Admissibility of Duplicates
Fed R. Evid. 1004 -- Admissibility of Other Evidence of Contents
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(d)
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f)

Key Terms:
Adequate Protection
prima facie Evidence
Security Interests - Perfection

Steven Derkson, v. Tori L. Tomas-Haarstick (In re Tomas-Haarstick), Adv. No. 01-3227, Case No. 01-34821-7 (12/07/2001) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 12/07/2001

Case Summary:
This case involves hypothetical discharge and its procedural requirements.  Plaintiff filed an adversary complaint to determine whether a debt was dischargeable and the Debtor answered.  But the Plaintiff filed the initial complaint thinking it was against Debtor’s husband who has a similar first name as debtor.  Plaintiff amended the complaint by adding allegations against Debtor’s husband and objecting to the hypothetical discharge of his tortious debt.  However, Plaintiff did not seek the Debtor’s or Court’s consent before amending the complaint.  In addition, the Plaintiff did not name Debtor’s spouse on the amended complaint.  The time limit to object to Debtor’s discharge had since passed.  Debtor filed a motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding contending that any complaint seeking to deny Debtor’s spouse’s hypothetical discharge is now time barred.  Plaintiff responded by filing a motion to enlarge the time within which to bring the action under § 523(a)(6), which motion in itself is untimely but which was considered as a motion to further amend the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).  It was determined that the motion to amend the Complaint to name Debtor’s spouse as a defendant is granted.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - Willful and Malicious Injury
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) -- Amendments
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)

Key Terms:
Hypothetical Discharge

Judge Thomas S. Utschig

In re Kedrowski, Case No. 00-54870-7 (08/28/2002) (284 B.R. 439) -- Judge Thomas S. Utschig 08/28/2002

Case Summary:
Chapter 7 trustee sought turnover of debtor’s “per capita” distribution from tribal revenues.   The debtor was an “enrolled member” of the Ho-Chunk Nation and as such was entitled to receive a per capita distribution from gaming revenues if the tribe elected to make a distribution.  In the past, she had received approximately $8,000 a year.  The court concluded that the debtor’s “right” to receive this money constituted property of the estate, much as if the debtor held stock in a business.  The trustee’s motion for turnover was granted.

Statue/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 541 -- Property of the Estate

Key Terms:
Property of the Estate

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