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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Available Decisions:

  • Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay -- 2013 - present
  • Judge William V. Altenberger -- 2016 - present
  • Judge Rachel M. Blise -- 2021 - present
  • Judge William H. Frawley -- 1973 - 1986
  • Judge G. Michael Halfenger -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Beth E. Hanan -- 2023 - present
  • Judge Brett H. Ludwig -- 2017 - 2020
  • Judge Thomas M. Lynch -- 2018 - present
  • Judge Robert D. Martin -- 1990 - 2016
  • Judge Katherine M. Perhach -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Thomas S. Utschig -- 1986 - 2012

Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, and Bank of America, N.A. v. AIG Federal Savings Bank, PNC Bank, N.A., HSBC Bank USA, and Paula Dean Laddusire (In re Laddusire), Adv. No. 13-0042, Case No. 12-16616-11 (06/20/2013) (494 B.R. 383) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 06/20/2013

Case Summary:
When the Debtor filed bankruptcy in December 2012, an action to foreclose on her home had been pending in Oneida County Circuit Court since January 2009. She removed the foreclosure action to the bankruptcy court, and Bank of America filed a Motion to Remand, Abstain, or Dismiss. After analyzing the impact of removal and remand on the foreclosure action and the bankruptcy case in light of a fourteen-item list of factors, the bankruptcy court concluded that "permissive" abstention was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).

Statute/Rule References:
28 U.S.C. § 1334 -- Abstention
28 U.S.C. § 1452 -- Removal
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9027 -- Removal

Key Terms:
Abstention
Removal

Paula Dean Laddusire v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company (In re Laddusire), Adv. No. 13-0043, Case No. 12-16616-11 (06/06/2013) (494 B.R. 373) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 06/06/2013

Case Summary:
The Debtor sued her insurance company in state court seeking payment for damage to her house under a homeowners insurance policy. Eighteen months after the state court action commenced, the Debtor filed her bankruptcy petition. Four months later, she sought to remove the case to the Bankruptcy Court. The insurance company filed a motion for abstention or remand. After analyzing the impact of removal and remand on the state court action and the bankruptcy case in light of a fourteen-item list of factors, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that "permissive" abstention was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).

Statute/Rule References:
28 U.S.C. § 1334 -- Abstention

Key Terms:
Abstention

Suzannah Meta Schmid v. Bank of America, N.A., and Associated Bank, N.A. (In re Schmid), Adv. No. 12-0160, Case No. 10-12142-13 (04/24/2013) (494 B.R. 737) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 04/24/2013

Case Summary:
The Debtor filed an adversary proceeding against Bank of America, the holder of her mortgage and note, seeking a determination that the bank lacked standing to foreclose. The bank filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Noting a final judgment of the Portage County Circuit Court on the issue of the ownership of the mortgage and note, the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Debtor's claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In the alternative, the Court ruled that the Debtor's claims were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. It also found that the Debtor's complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). The Debtor's motion to amend her complaint was therefore denied, and Bank of America's motion to dismiss was granted. Affirmed by the District Court.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) -- Failure to State a Claim

Key Terms:
Claims - Allowance
Rooker-Feldman

In re Isaacs, Case No. 12-12406-7 (04/11/2013) (491 B.R. 893) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 04/11/2013

Case Summary:
The Chapter 7 Trustee objected to the Debtors' claim of exemptions in an unimproved 21-acre parcel of land under Wis. Stat. § 815.20, the Wisconsin homestead exemption. The Trustee contended that the vacant land was not "reasonably necessary for the use of the dwelling as a home" as required by the statute. The parcel is adjacent to the parcel on which the Debtors' home sits. In response to the Trustee's objection, the Debtors argued that the vacant parcel was reasonably necessary to the homestead because it generates rental income and income from the sale of timber. In addition, the Debtors collect firewood, hunt, and hold family reunions on the parcel. They also receive tax benefits by participating in a Managed Forest Lands stewardship forestry plan. Acknowledging the strong Wisconsin policy favoring a debtor's right to claim a homestead exemption, the Court noted a line of cases that recognized a limit to that right. Interpreting the phrase "reasonably necessary for the use of the dwelling as a home," the Court distinguished between uses of the land that simply create some benefit, and uses that are truly necessary to the home. Applied here, the Court found that the Debtors' use of the vacant parcel was periodic and primarily recreational, and that the income generated from it was insufficient to be considered necessary. As a result, the Court concluded that the land was not reasonably necessary for the use of the dwelling as a home. The Trustee's objection was sustained.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) -- Exemptions - State-Law
Wis. Stat. § 815.20 -- Homestead Exemption

Key Terms:
Exemptions
Homestead Exemption

In re Saxe, Case No. 12-13807-7 (03/22/2013) (491 B.R. 244) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 03/22/2013

Case Summary:
Chapter 7 debtors sought to avoid a lien on various items of farm equipment. The creditor asserted that it had a purchase-money security interest in one item, a skidsteer. The Debtors disputed the existence of a PMSI, argued that there had been a novation, and that their payments on the debt should be applied first to the skidsteer (such that the PMSI was paid, and the remaining obligation was a general security interest). The Bankruptcy Court found that the security agreement created a PMSI. The subsequent renewal of the loan did not constitute a novation, as the differences between the two notes were minimal, no additional funds were borrowed, and there was no indication that the original obligation was extinguished. Finally, under Wisconsin law regarding the application of payments, payments are applied first to obligations secured by purchase-money security interests only if “more than one obligation is secured.” Here, there was only one obligation, and payments would be applied to the whole debt (and the PMSI would be removed only after the entire debt has been satisfied). The motion to avoid the lien was denied as to the skidsteer.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) -- Lien Avoidance
Wis. Stat. § 409.103 -- Purchase - Money Security Interest

Key Terms:
Lien Avoidance
Purchase - Money Security Interest

In re Spencer, Case No. 10-15242-7 (02/12/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 02/12/2013

Case Summary:
After receiving a discharge, the Debtor sought to reopen her bankruptcy case in order to administer assets, amend her schedules, and have her case administered “on the basis of true facts.” She had been contesting the foreclosure of the mortgage on her home in Wood County Circuit Court for nearly four years, and had recently filed a Notice of Removal of that action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The Debtor’s motion to reopen her bankruptcy case alleged that she expected a recovery against PNC Bank for fraud and violations of several state and federal laws related to the foreclosure proceeding. She believed that these assets should be made available to her creditors. Citing Redmond v. Fifth Third Bank, 624 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2010), the court held that the Debtor’s motion was untimely, that it appeared highly unlikely she was entitled to bankruptcy relief, and that either the state court or the district court were the appropriate fora for her action.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 350(b) -- Reopening

Key Terms:
Reopening

Judge Robert D. Martin

Andrew J. and Cheryl L. Cikar v. Blackhawk Community Credit Union (In re Cikar), Adv. No. 13-0013, Case No. 12-14328-7 (06/11/2013) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 06/11/2013
Jamie L. Thrun v. Blackhawk Community Credit Union (In re Thrun), Adv. No. 12-0231, Case No. 12-14405-7 (06/11/2013) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 06/11/2013
Patricia A. Johnson, et al. v. Andrew J. Weihert (In re Weihert), Adv. 12-0105, Case No. 12-10893-7 (05/31/2013) (493 B.R. 61) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 05/31/2013

Case Summary:
Plaintiffs objected to the bill of costs filed by the prevailing defendant, specifically to expert witness fees in the amount of $ 3,250 for the medical examiner. Under Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), outside of court-appointed expert witnesses, an award of expert witness fees is limited to the amount in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 unless the parties have contracted otherwise or there is explicit statutory authority to the contrary. The Plaintiffs argued that the expert witness fees for the medical examiner should be limited to the amounts set forth in § 1821. The Defendant argued that the fees were authorized by Wisconsin Statutes §§ 59.36 and 59.38. The Bankruptcy Court held that rate setting is not the type of statutory authorization to which Crawford was referring. While these provisions authorized the medical examiner’s fees in the sense that they authorized how much he may charge for his services as a medical examiner, the Supreme Court in Crawford meant that there must be statutory authorization for the fees to be taxed as costs. Therefore, the Defendant’s award of costs was limited to the amounts set forth in § 1821.

Statute/Rule References:
28 U.S.C. § 1821
28 U.S.C. § 1920
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054
Wis. Stat. § 59.38
Wis. Stat. § 59.36

Key Terms:
Expert Witness Fees
Fee Dispute

In re Willis, Case No. 12-16372-7 (05/22/2013) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 05/22/2013

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