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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay

Steven John Wlodyga and Linda Wlodyga v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., and Chase Home Finance, LLC (In re Wlodyga), Adv. No. 13-0001, Case No. 12-15455-7 (11/25/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 11/25/2013

Case Summary:
Chapter 7 debtors brought an adversary proceeding seeking a determination that the junior mortgage on their home was invalid. The Debtors argued that although they both signed the promissory note—and although they acknowledge they received and spent the loan proceeds—one of the debtors did not remember signing the mortgage and, as a result, either the signature that appeared on the mortgage was a forgery or the result of misrepresentation and fraud. Despite its skepticism of the Debtors’ “obviously self-serving” representations, the Court concluded that the ultimate factual question turned on a credibility assessment that could only be made in person. Accordingly, it denied summary judgment and set the matter for trial.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056 -- Summary Judgment
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) -- Summary Judgment

Key Terms:
Summary Judgment

James Richard Thoen v. Kathleen E. Kevan (In re Kevan), Adv. No. 12-0220, Case No. 12-14575-7 (09/23/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 09/23/2013

Case Summary:
The Plaintiff filed an adversary complaint seeking a determination that a Minnesota state court punitive damages award was nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Under Minnesota law, punitive damages are available if a plaintiff shows a defendant acted with a deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others, acting with intent or indifference. By contrast, section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove the debtor acted in conscious disregard of her duties and intended to injure the creditor or was substantially certain injury would occur. Looking at a special verdict without the jury instructions and the state court record, the court had no basis to determine whether the jury concluded the defendant acted willfully and maliciously. The jury answered "yes" to the question of whether the defendant acted "with deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others." It could have found that the defendant acted with reckless disregard, which is insufficient to demonstrate willfulness and maliciousness under section 523(a)(6). Therefore, the court denied both motions for summary judgment.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - Willful and Malicious Injury

Key Terms:
Collateral Estoppel
Willful and Malicious - Defined

In re Schmid, Case No. 10-12142-13 (09/05/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 09/05/2013

Case Summary:
The Debtor persistently sought, from a variety of procedural angles in state and federal court, a finding that the mortgage on her home was invalid. After the Court entered an order dismissing her adversary proceeding and denying her claim objection concerning her mortgage, the Debtor sought Rule 60 relief from the Court’s judgment. The Court found that the Debtor had failed to show the relevance of allegedly “newly discovered evidence,” the existence of any evidence of “fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct,” or the merit of her position that the court’s judgment was void. In light of these findings, and after concluding that the Debtor appeared to be using her motion for relief as a substitute for an appeal, the Court denied the motion. Affirmed by the District Court.

Statute/Rule References:
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 -- Relief from Judgment or Order
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) -- Relief from Judgment or Order

Key Terms:
Relief from Judgment or Order

Esurance Insurance Company v. Jeffrey Scott Keesee (In re Keesee), Adv. No. 13-0019, Case No. 12-16788-7 (08/22/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 08/22/2013

Case Summary:
An insurance company sought a determination that the debt and accrued interest arising from a state court judgment related to the Debtor’s drunk driving conviction was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9). On summary judgment, the Court concluded there was no genuine dispute as to the relevant facts and that judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. The Court determined that both the state court judgment and post-judgment interest were nondischargeable. The Court specified, however, that the amounts were nondischargeable as to the Debtor alone and not to his co-debtor wife. In support of this finding, it noted that the adversary proceeding had been brought against only the Debtor, not his wife, and that in any event Wisconsin law protects the innocent spouse and her property from liability for her spouse’s torts.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) -- Nondischargeability - Drunk Driving
Wis. Stat. § 766.55(2) -- Marital Property

Key Terms:
Drunk Driving
Marital Property

In re Weiner, Case No. 11-17754-12 (08/22/2013) -- Judge Catherine J. Furay 08/22/2013

Case Summary:
The Chapter 12 standing trustee objected to confirmation of the debtor’s amended plan on the grounds that it impermissibly provided for direct payment of an impaired secured claim. The Court recognized a split of authority among the circuits, and no Seventh Circuit authority directly on point. After evaluating the two most prominent approaches—one which categorically prohibited the direct payment of impaired secured claims and the other that permitted direct payments under certain circumstances—the Court overruled the Trustee’s objection and confirmed the amended plan. The Court endorsed the thirteen-factor test set forth in In re Pianowski, 92 B.R. 225 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988), and concluded that proposals to make direct payments should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 1226(c) -- Payments

Key Terms:
Direct Payments

Judge Robert D. Martin

In re Martin, Case No. 13-10756-7 (10/29/2013) (503 B.R. 172) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 10/29/2013

Case Summary:
The U.S. Department of Agriculture sought stay relief to set off a debt the IRS owed to the Chapter 7 debtor for a tax refund against a debt the Debtor owed it on a home loan guaranty. Debtor argued that setoff should not be allowed because the USDA did not hold an enforceable claim against her. Debtor claimed that Chase Home Finance LLC waived any deficiency on the mortgage in a foreclosure proceeding in state court. Debtor also argued that because she was misled by the waiver of deficiency, she did not contest the entry of judgment, the sale process, the price obtained at the sale, or the costs assessed. The Court held that the claim was enforceable because it was based on an indemnity contract signed by the Debtor, and not on subrogation. The Court also found that the language in the complaint was not misleading on its face, and Debtor failed to demonstrate that unsophisticated consumers found the challenged statements to be misleading or deceptive.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 553 -- Setoff
15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)

Key Terms:
Home Loan Guaranty
Setoff

In re Reed, Case No. 11-17027-13 (10/29/2013) (500 B.R. 564) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 10/29/2013

Case Summary:
Debtors filed a Chapter 13 petition in November 2011. The IRS sought to offset the Debtors' 2012 income tax refund against the Debtors’ 2011 tax liability. Debtors argued that the 2011 tax liability was attributable to a 401(k) distribution that was received during the tax year and could not be offset by their post-petition tax refund for a later year. The Court allowed the setoff and held that the 2011 tax liability arose postpetition because “all events” necessary for that liability to accrue took place on the last day of the tax period, after the Debtors had filed their Chapter 13 petition.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 553 -- Setoff

Key Terms:
Setoff
Taxes - Refund

In re Wirth, Case No. 11-17555-13 (10/29/2013) (503 B.R. 800) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 10/29/2013

Case Summary:
In a prior ruling the bankruptcy court disallowed 50 percent of BMO's fees for lack of specificity. Subsequently, BMO filed a supplemental claim asserting a claim for attorney's fees incurred post-confirmation for work done in connection with the debtor's objection to its first supplemental claim. Debtor objected that the claim was not specific, violated the creditor's obligation of good faith and fair dealing, and was not caused by debtor's default. The Court sustained Debtor’s objection and held that the fees were not reasonable because they resulted from creditor's prior insufficient itemization of attorney's fees. “The Debtor should not be penalized for BMO's failure to prepare its fee notice in compliance to these standards.”

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 506(b)
11 U.S.C. § 1322(e)

Key Terms:
Attorney Fees

Condon Oil Company v. Michael Wood (In re Wood), Adv. No. 12-0181, Case No. 12-13442-7 (08/19/2013) (503 B.R. 705) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 08/09/2013
In re Nickeas, Case No. 11-12304-7 (08/06/2013) (503 B.R. 453) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 08/06/2013

Case Summary:
Debtors sought to avoid a lien on a liquor license under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(B)(ii) as a “tool of the trade.” The license had been exempted under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5), the “wildcard” exemption. The Debtors owned a golf course, and there was no dispute that the liquor license was necessary for the success of the business. The Bankruptcy Court determined that the lien could not be avoided because the license was not a tool of the trade. The Court explained that in the Seventh Circuit, the reference to “tools of the trade” in § 522(f) takes on the meaning of either the federal tools of the trade exemption under § 522(d)(6) or the state tools of the trade exemption, depending on which the Debtor has elected. In re Thompson, 867 F.2d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 1989). In this case, the Debtors elected the federal exemptions, and therefore were limited to the narrow definition of the federal tools of the trade exemption as set forth by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Patterson, 825 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir. 1987). Patterson stated that the purpose of the tools of the federal tools of the trade exemption is to enable an artisan to retain tools of modest value, like rakes and other hand tools, so that he is not forced out of his trade. The Bankruptcy Court held that under this reasoning, a liquor license is not a tool of the trade.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) -- Lien Avoidance

Key Terms:
Lien Avoidance
Tools of the Trade

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