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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Available Decisions:

  • Chief Judge Catherine J. Furay -- 2013 - present
  • Judge William V. Altenberger -- 2016 - present
  • Judge Rachel M. Blise -- 2021 - present
  • Judge William H. Frawley -- 1973 - 1986
  • Judge G. Michael Halfenger -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Beth E. Hanan -- 2023 - present
  • Judge Brett H. Ludwig -- 2017 - 2020
  • Judge Thomas M. Lynch -- 2018 - present
  • Judge Robert D. Martin -- 1990 - 2016
  • Judge Katherine M. Perhach -- 2020 - present
  • Judge Thomas S. Utschig -- 1986 - 2012

Judge Robert D. Martin

Digital Systems Engineering, Inc. v. Bernadette Moreno (In re Moreno), Adv. No. 09-0008, Case No. 08-15204-7 (08/17/2019) (414 B.R. 485) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 08/17/2009

Case Summary:
The Plaintiff brought a prepetition suit against the Chapter 7 Debtor in state court, alleging that the debtor stole nearly $300,000 from the Plaintiff, her employer. During the pendency of the proceeding, the state commenced a criminal proceeding against the Debtor, and she invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. The state court granted the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to fraud and unjust enrichment in a minute entry, but made no factual findings. Later, the state court held the Debtor’s marital community liable for unlawful acts, including racketeering. The Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment in the adversary proceeding and argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the debtor from litigating the issue of nondischargeability. The Court agreed with the Plaintiff and found that the state court’s two holdings, taken together, should be given preclusive effect as to the Plaintiff’s § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6) claims. The Court held that the minute entry order constituted a final judgment and rejected the Debtor’s argument that she was prevented from litigating the state court suit due to her invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud in Fiduciary Capacity
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - Willful and Malicious Injury
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1802

Key Terms:
Collateral Estoppel
Embezzlement
Final Judgment
Fraud
Jurisdiction
Larceny
Self-Incrimination Privilege
Unjust Enrichment
Willful and Malicious - Defined

In re York, Case No. 09-11577-13 (07/20/2009) (415 B.R. 377) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 07/20/2009

Case Summary:
The Chapter 13 Trustee objected to the above-median income debtors’ 60-month plan.  The plan proposed monthly payments of $750.  Application of the means test resulted in negative disposable income, but Schedules I & J disclosed disposable income of $1,563.98.  The Chapter 13 Trustee contended that the Debtors should be required to commit all of the disposable income identified on Schedules I & J to a plan of less than 60 months, resulting in a 100% dividend to unsecured creditors.  The Court overruled the objection, holding that § 1325(b)(4) does not permit the Court to approve a plan of less than 60 months for an above-median income debtor.  The Court also rejected the Chapter 13 Trustee’s argument that the confirmed plan should be modified under § 1329 immediately following plan confirmation.  The Court noted that § 1329 permitted modification, but that under the specific facts of the case, modification was not warranted.  Specifically, the Court cited a total lack of any changed circumstances following confirmation and the lack of good faith inherent in attempting to circumvent the requirements of In re Mancl, 381 B.R. 537, 541 (W.D. Wis. 2008).

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 1325 -- Confirmation of Chapter 13 Plan
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)
11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) -- Modification of Plan After Confirmation
11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)

Key Terms:
Above-Median Income Debtor
Applicable Commitment Period
Changed Circumstances
Good Faith
Modification
Projected Disposable Income

In re Fess, Case No. 06-11890-7 (05/04/2009) (408 B.R. 793) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 05/04/2009

Case Summary:
The Chapter 7 Debtor was a member of the Ho-Chunk Nation. The Court entered an order on the Debtor’s default directing the Nation to turnover future per capita payments due the Debtor. The Nation refused, and the Chapter 7 Trustee moved for turnover of future per capita payments received by the Debtor. The Court denied the motion, holding that future per capita payments were not property of the estate. Federal and tribal law determined the nature of the Debtor’s property interest in the future per capita payments. Under tribal law, the Debtor had no interest in a per capita payment until the payment was received. Therefore, the Debtor had no interest in future per capita payments at the time of filing that entered the bankruptcy estate. The Court also held that law of the case doctrine did not prevent it from reconsidering a previous order, entered on the Debtor’s default, that future per capita payments were property of the estate.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 346(f) -- Trustee Tax Withholding Obligations
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)
Wis. Stat. § 705.01(6)
Wis. Stat. § 705.03(2)
Wis. Stat. § 851.17

Key Terms:
Law of the Case
per capita Payments
Property of the Estate

Thomas R. Holter v. Claire Ann Resop (In re Holter), Adv No. 08-0168, Case No. 08-12209-7 (01/26/2009) (401 B.R. 372) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 01/26/2009

Case Summary:
The Chapter 7 Debtor was the beneficiary of a P.O.D. account. Between the date of filing and 180 days after filing, the owner of the P.O.D. account died. The Debtor turned over the non-exempt portion of the proceeds from the P.O.D. account over to the Chapter 7 Trustee. Later, the Debtor reconsidered and demanded that the Chapter 7 Trustee return the funds. The Chapter 7 Trustee refused, and the Debtor commenced an adversary proceeding to recover the funds. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Debtor, holding that under Wisconsin law, a P.O.D. beneficiary has no interest in a P.O.D. account during the P.O.D. account owner’s lifetime. In addition, under Wisconsin law, the proceeds were not a bequest, inheritance, or devise for purposes of § 541(a)(5)(A). Therefore, the Debtor had no interest in the account at the time of filing that entered the bankruptcy estate.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 102(3)
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)
Wis. Stat. § 705.01(6)
Wis. Stat. § 705.03(2)
Wis. Stat. § 851.17

Key Terms:
Bequest
Devise
Inheritance
Property of the Estate
P.O.D. Account

In re Roll, Case No. 08-11943-7 and In re Currie, Case No. 08-11944-7 (11/10/2008) (400 B.R. 674) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 11/10/2008

Case Summary:
The Debtors were housemates and filed separate Chapter 7 petitions. Together, their incomes exceeded the median income; separately, their incomes were below the median income. The U.S. Trustee filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to § 707(b)(2) and (3). The Court denied the U.S. Trustee’s motions without prejudice. The Court found that the U.S. Trustee had not carried its burden of demonstrating that some or all of each debtor’s income was used to pay household expenses of the other debtor and should have been included as “income” for purposes of the means test. The Court concluded that ability to pay, standing alone, is not sufficient to serve as the basis of a finding of abuse under the totality of the circumstances inquiry of § 707(b)(3). The Court also found that the U.S. Trustee had not carried its burden to demonstrate that the totality of the circumstances supported a finding of abuse pursuant to § 707(b)(3).

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(a)
11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(b)
11 U.S.C. § 101(15)
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1)
11 U.S.C. § 707(2)
11 U.S.C. § 707(3)
11 U.S.C. § 707(7)(a)

Key Terms:
Ability to Pay
Abuse
Bad Faith
Income
Means Test
Motion to Dismiss
Substantial Abuse

In re Carter, Case No. 05-14465-13 (11/07/2008) (401 B.R. 369) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 11/07/2008

Case Summary:
The Chapter 13 Debtors’ attorney filed an application for additional fees shortly before the Debtors obtained a discharge. The Debtors objected. The Court concluded that it had “arising under” jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) to consider the attorney’s request as to the estate. The request for compensation was denied because the estate was already closed, and no fees could be awarded from the closed estate. The Court also concluded that the attorney’s post-confirmation fees were not discharged in bankruptcy. The Court expressed no opinion as to whether it had jurisdiction to consider the attorney’s claim against the Debtors personally, or whether it would grant such a request.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 330 (a)(4)(A) and (B) -- Compensation of Officers
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2)
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2)
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) -- Discharge
28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1)
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016 (b) -- Disclosure of Compensation Paid or Promised to Attorney for Debtor
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2017
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001 -- Adversary Proceedings

Key Terms:
Attorney Fees - Award in Dischargeability Action
Compensation of Professionals
Discharge 
Dischargeability
Fee Dispute
Jurisdiction

Farmers Implement Store of Mineral Point, Inc., v. Matthew S. Jorenby, et al. (In re Jorenby) Adv. No. 07-0190, Case No. 07-13708-7 (06/09/2008) (393 B.R. 663) -- Judge Robert Martin 06/09/2008

Case Summary:
Complaints on dischargeability. The Debtor sold the Plaintiffs’ collateral without their consent. Plaintiffs separately sought to have debts declared nondischargeable for “willful and malicious injury.” As to Farmers Implement Store, there was no provision barring the sale of its collateral in the security agreement, thus there was no conversion, and its complaint was dismissed. As to Farmers Savings Bank, the Debtor testified that he knew that the sale of the collateral would injure the Bank. A conversion with knowledge that injury would result is “willful and malicious,” so the debt was excepted from discharge § 523(a)(6).

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - Willful and Malicious Injury
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(7)

Key Terms:
Willful and Malicious - Defined
Non-Dischargeable Debt

In re Shafer and Webb, Case No. 07-15085-13 (06/09/2008) (393 B.R. 655) -- Judge Robert D. Martin 06/09/2008

Case Summary:
Chapter 13 plan confirmation. The Debtors’ case was dismissed for lack of good faith under the totality-of-the-circumstances test. The Debtors’ income, expenses, assets, occupation, a prior voluntary dismissal and refiling to avoid preference payments, and the likelihood that the Debtors were abusing Chapter 13 to parlay into an early retirement demonstrated an effort not to pay creditors.

Key Terms:
Dismissal

Judge Thomas S. Utschig

Kendra Lea Miller v. United States of America, acting through Rural Development Rural Housing Service, successor in interest to the United States Department of Agriculture (In re Miller), Adv. No. 08-0118, Case No. 08-11097-7 (07/08/2009) (414 B.R. 481) 07/08/2009

Case Summary:
Debtor filed an adversary proceeding seeking damages for an alleged violation of the automatic stay. The defendant was an agency of the United States and a creditor of the debtor. The defendant had certified its judgment to the IRS pursuant to statutory provisions which allowed federal agencies to offset their claims against “tax overpayments” made by debtors. The defendant had refused to surrender a refund of $1,393.00 which it had received under this program. The debtor contended that her exemption claim trumped the agency’s setoff rights. The Court found that § 553 preserves whatever setoff rights otherwise exist, and that because the bankruptcy code does not alter or affect setoff rights, the debtor’s exemption claim could not “trump” the creditor’s rights under § 553. Judgment was granted in favor of the creditor.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 362(h) -- Damages for Willful Stay Violations
11 U.S.C. § 522(c) -- Exemptions - As Against Federal Tax Liens
11 U.S.C. § 553 -- Setoff

Key Terms:
Automatic Stay
Exemptions (Federal Tax Lein)
Setoff

Jeremy Hoffman v. Paul H. Sabaska and Amy S. Sabaska (In re Sabaska), Adv. No. 08-0106, Case No. 08-11068-7 (02/06/2009) – Judge Thomas S. Utschig 02/06/2009

Case Summary:
Creditor brought an adversary proceeding seeking to deny the debtors’ discharge, arguing that the debtors had transferred assets with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors in violation of § 727(a)(2) or that they failed to satisfactorily explain a loss or diminution in assets in violation of § 727(a)(5). The debtor husband had previously operated a trucking business, and the creditor was a former business partner who had obtained a judgment against him. The creditor contended that the assignment of various leases for semi-trailers to a new entity owned by the debtor’s aunt was a transfer of assets, and the debtor intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors by doing so. The creditor also contended that the debtor failed to explain the loss of assets, including business revenues associated with the trucking business. The court found that the debtor wife had no involvement in the conduct in question, and consequently there was no evidence to support denial of her discharge. As to the husband, the court acknowledged that the assignment of leases was a “transfer” of property, but the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any subjective intent as the debtor was simply attempting to stay in business. The court also found that debtor’s explanation as to the ultimate surrender or repossession of the trailers by the lessor was satisfactory, and that the creditor did not demonstrate any other loss of assets for which the debtor did not have an adequate explanation. The adversary complaint was dismissed.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) -- Denial of Discharge - Transfer of Assets
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5) -- Denial of Discharge - Loss of Assets

Key Terms:
Discharge (Denial of Discharge)

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