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Opinions

The Western District of Wisconsin offers a database of opinions for the years 1986 to present, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword, statute, rule or case number in the search box above.

Opinions are also available on the Government Printing Office website for Appellate, District and Bankruptcy cases. The content of this collection dates back to April 2004, though searchable electronic holdings for some courts may be incomplete for this earlier time period.

For a direct link to the Western Wisconsin Bankruptcy Court on-line opinions, visit this link.

Judge Robert D. Martin

Case Summary:
The Chapter 7 Trustee brought a preference avoidance action. The Defendant orally agreed to guarantee a debt the Debtor, owed to a third party. This guarantee was made gratuitously and orally, as a favor to his friend. When the Debtor’s payment failed to clear, the Defendant paid the obligation on the Debtor’s behalf. The Debtor then repaid the Defendant. The Trustee sought to avoid those repayments. The parties agreed that the elements of a preference were present. The Court found no defense under § 547(c) applied, in that the guarantee was outside the ordinary course for each man. Further, there was no contemporaneous exchange for new value. When the Debtor repaid the Defendant, he received no new value in exchange, just cancellation of an antecedent debt.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) -- Preferences
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) -- Preferences
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) -- Preferences
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) -- Preferences

Key Terms:
Contemporaneous Exchange for New Value
New Value
Ordinary Course
Preferences


Case Summary:
The initial Chapter 7 Trustee resigned due to a conflict of interest, and a successor trustee was appointed.  The initial trustee applied to the Court for compensation pursuant to the formula in § 326(a).  The successor trustee objected.  The Court noted that § 326(c) caps compensation for multiple trustees, but fails to specify how trustees should divide compensation.  After considering a variety of approaches, the Court determined that the total compensation due under § 326(a) should be calculated when the case was closed, then divided between the two trustees on a pro rata basis based on the quantity of disbursements each made to creditors.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 326(a)
11 U.S.C. § 326(c)

Key Terms:
Compensation
Conversion
Trustee Fees


Case Summary:
The Chapter 13 Debtors agreed to pay their mortgage lender $555.56 per month toward mortgage arrears. The parties memorialized this agreement in an agreed order signed by the Court. Five months after the order was entered, the Debtors objected to the lender’s proof of claim for mortgage arrears. The Trustee then began to withhold the monthly payment that would otherwise have gone to the mortgage lender, pending resolution of the objection. Before the objection was resolved, the Debtors voluntarily dismissed their case. The mortgage lender moved for disbursement of the withheld funds and the Debtors objected, contending that the monies should be paid to them or to other secured creditors, pro rata. The Court held that under its prior order, the monies should be paid to the mortgage lender. Section 1322(a)(3) required that all secured creditors be treated the same, and the other secured creditors had already received their pro rata shares.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3)
11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1)
11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2)

Key Terms:
Discrimination
Plan Payment
pro rata


Case Summary:
The Plaintiff brought a prepetition suit against the Chapter 7 Debtor in state court, alleging that the debtor stole nearly $300,000 from the Plaintiff, her employer. During the pendency of the proceeding, the state commenced a criminal proceeding against the Debtor, and she invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. The state court granted the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to fraud and unjust enrichment in a minute entry, but made no factual findings. Later, the state court held the Debtor’s marital community liable for unlawful acts, including racketeering. The Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment in the adversary proceeding and argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the debtor from litigating the issue of nondischargeability. The Court agreed with the Plaintiff and found that the state court’s two holdings, taken together, should be given preclusive effect as to the Plaintiff’s § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6) claims. The Court held that the minute entry order constituted a final judgment and rejected the Debtor’s argument that she was prevented from litigating the state court suit due to her invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) -- Nondischargeability - Fraud in Fiduciary Capacity
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - Willful and Malicious Injury
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1802

Key Terms:
Collateral Estoppel
Embezzlement
Final Judgment
Fraud
Jurisdiction
Larceny
Self-Incrimination Privilege
Unjust Enrichment
Willful and Malicious - Defined


Case Summary:
The Chapter 13 Trustee objected to the above-median income debtors’ 60-month plan.  The plan proposed monthly payments of $750.  Application of the means test resulted in negative disposable income, but Schedules I & J disclosed disposable income of $1,563.98.  The Chapter 13 Trustee contended that the Debtors should be required to commit all of the disposable income identified on Schedules I & J to a plan of less than 60 months, resulting in a 100% dividend to unsecured creditors.  The Court overruled the objection, holding that § 1325(b)(4) does not permit the Court to approve a plan of less than 60 months for an above-median income debtor.  The Court also rejected the Chapter 13 Trustee’s argument that the confirmed plan should be modified under § 1329 immediately following plan confirmation.  The Court noted that § 1329 permitted modification, but that under the specific facts of the case, modification was not warranted.  Specifically, the Court cited a total lack of any changed circumstances following confirmation and the lack of good faith inherent in attempting to circumvent the requirements of In re Mancl, 381 B.R. 537, 541 (W.D. Wis. 2008).

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 1325 -- Confirmation of Chapter 13 Plan
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)
11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) -- Modification of Plan After Confirmation
11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)

Key Terms:
Above-Median Income Debtor
Applicable Commitment Period
Changed Circumstances
Good Faith
Modification
Projected Disposable Income


Case Summary:
The Chapter 7 Debtor was a member of the Ho-Chunk Nation. The Court entered an order on the Debtor’s default directing the Nation to turnover future per capita payments due the Debtor. The Nation refused, and the Chapter 7 Trustee moved for turnover of future per capita payments received by the Debtor. The Court denied the motion, holding that future per capita payments were not property of the estate. Federal and tribal law determined the nature of the Debtor’s property interest in the future per capita payments. Under tribal law, the Debtor had no interest in a per capita payment until the payment was received. Therefore, the Debtor had no interest in future per capita payments at the time of filing that entered the bankruptcy estate. The Court also held that law of the case doctrine did not prevent it from reconsidering a previous order, entered on the Debtor’s default, that future per capita payments were property of the estate.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 346(f) -- Trustee Tax Withholding Obligations
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)
Wis. Stat. § 705.01(6)
Wis. Stat. § 705.03(2)
Wis. Stat. § 851.17

Key Terms:
Law of the Case
per capita Payments
Property of the Estate


Judge Thomas S. Utschig

Case Summary:
Debtor filed an adversary proceeding seeking damages for an alleged violation of the automatic stay. The defendant was an agency of the United States and a creditor of the debtor. The defendant had certified its judgment to the IRS pursuant to statutory provisions which allowed federal agencies to offset their claims against “tax overpayments” made by debtors. The defendant had refused to surrender a refund of $1,393.00 which it had received under this program. The debtor contended that her exemption claim trumped the agency’s setoff rights. The Court found that § 553 preserves whatever setoff rights otherwise exist, and that because the bankruptcy code does not alter or affect setoff rights, the debtor’s exemption claim could not “trump” the creditor’s rights under § 553. Judgment was granted in favor of the creditor.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 362(h) -- Damages for Willful Stay Violations
11 U.S.C. § 522(c) -- Exemptions - As Against Federal
Tax Liens
11 U.S.C. § 553 -- Setoff

Key Terms:
Automatic Stay
Exemptions (Federal Tax Lein)
Setoff


Case Summary:
Creditor brought an adversary proceeding seeking to deny the debtors’ discharge, arguing that the debtors had transferred assets with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors in violation of § 727(a)(2) or that they failed to satisfactorily explain a loss or diminution in assets in violation of § 727(a)(5). The debtor husband had previously operated a trucking business, and the creditor was a former business partner who had obtained a judgment against him. The creditor contended that the assignment of various leases for semi-trailers to a new entity owned by the debtor’s aunt was a transfer of assets, and the debtor intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors by doing so. The creditor also contended that the debtor failed to explain the loss of assets, including business revenues associated with the trucking business. The court found that the debtor wife had no involvement in the conduct in question, and consequently there was no evidence to support denial of her discharge. As to the husband, the court acknowledged that the assignment of leases was a “transfer” of property, but the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any subjective intent as the debtor was simply attempting to stay in business. The court also found that debtor’s explanation as to the ultimate surrender or repossession of the trailers by the lessor was satisfactory, and that the creditor did not demonstrate any other loss of assets for which the debtor did not have an adequate explanation. The adversary complaint was dismissed.

Statute/Rule References:
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) -- Denial of Discharge - Transfer of Assets
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5) -- Denial of Discharge - Loss of Assets

Key Terms:
Discharge (Denial of Discharge)


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